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Abstract
The present report highlights the main characteristics of large-scale land transactions and the practical implications of the
emerging agricultural holdings with respect to food security challenges at global and local level. The analysis makes a
distinction of land deals and investors in three different geographical areas (Africa, Black Sea Region and Latin America)
while also evaluating the social, economic and environmental impact for the recipient country. Results indicate that the
current wave of large-scale land transactions, triggered in the last five years, is largely focused on the production of the
so-called flex-crops (that can generate feed, fuel, fiber and feed). Concluding remarks include policy recommendations for
the inclusive development of agricultural sectors, particularly in low income countries.
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7E x e c u t i v e  s u m m a r y
The present report provides an overview of the scale, speed, 
drivers, key players and main expected consequences in 
terms of food security of the recent wave of (international) 
large-scale land transactions (LSLT´s) which has taken 
place at world level in the past years. This task is 
particularly challenging because a universal definition of 
what constitutes a ¨large¨ land investment as well as the 
potential advantages and disadvantages to all involved 
parties at different levels are not straightforward. Moreover, 
large-scale land transactions usually present different traits 
depending on the region in which they take place. Similarly, 
there is a wide range of investors with what appears to be (at 
first glance) rather different objectives. An added difficulty is 
related to the availability of reliable data (IFPRI, 2009). 
In order to overcome these obstacles, three basic steps were 
taken: 
i. Assess whether and how the wave of land deals is a 
new phenomenon, provide a working definition in order 
to identify actors and motives in both global and regional 
scenarios, 
ii. Understand why this new wave of LSLT´s emerged and 
establish a connection to food security challenges 
iii. Reflect on the theoretical and empirical consequences of 
LSLT´s at productivity, environmental and social level.
The main contributions of the present research are as 
follows:
1. The introduction of a wide-embracing definition of the 
recent wave of land deals (LSLT) in order to serve two key 
purposes:
a)  Distinguish the differences between previous forms of 
investment in land and the current wave of LSLT´s. Key 
differences relied in the larger scale, the speed (which 
was accentuated after the 2007-2008 food price crisis) 
and the active involvement of governments and other 
non-traditional investors in the agricultural sector. The 
profile of investors implied that the on-going debates 
on food and energy security as well as climate change 
and access to natural resources were major concerns 
behind LSLT´s. Another incentive to explore agricultural 
investment was the reduced availability of high return 
investment opportunities after the credit crunch and the 
favourable evolution of sovereign funds (particularly in 
countries that are relatively poor in terms of natural re-
sources).
b)  To analyse the different dimensions of LSLT´s in various 
regions. In this report the nature of LSLT´s in Africa, the 
Black Sea Region and Latin America are discussed in de-
tail. They reveal that investors have different strategies 
to access land which depend not only on their own needs 
and preferences but also in the institutional framework of 
the host economy. While in Latin America, LSLT´s mainly 
take place through local partners (given restrictions to 
foreign land ownership), in Africa, national authorities of 
countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo have 
agreed to lease up to half of their available arable land 
to foreign investors. In the Post-Soviet Union countries, 
the presence of agro-holdings has led to two alterna-
tives: either investors buy shares directly from farmers 
or they acquire agro-holding equity. There is evidence 
that in the Black Sea region both the number and degree 
of land concentration of agro-holdings have increased in 
the last years. Similarly, compensation schemes, labour 
regimes, infrastructure development plans, among other 
aspects, vary substantially from one region to the other. 
2. In order to analyse why LSLT´s are taking place at 
such speed and scale and how they are connected to food 
security challenges, the profile of investors as well as of 
recipient countries was explored. This implied not only a 
classification of investors and a typology of host countries 
but also an examination of key drivers from both sides of 
the land deal as well as an overview of emerging investment 
vehicles. The fact that most LSLT´s were aimed not only at 
agriculture above other sectors (Figure 1) but particularly 
at flexible crops (that could be used for both food and fuel) 
reflects that food and energy security challenges are at the 
heart of this world phenomenon. In other words, all types of 
investors were looking to fulfill and profit from the increasing 
world demand of food and fuel; from governments seeking 
to secure food supply at constant prices, (small, medium or 
large) energy companies (usually driven by biofuel adoption-
policies), financial institutions extending their investment 
portfolios, agri-businesses of all sizes (from domestic to 
transnational corporations) securing access to key inputs. 
From the side of host countries, LSLT´s were seen as a way 
to foster development in stagnant (labour-abundant) (semi)
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subsistence farming sectors or as a welcomed flow of capital 
in land-abundant agro-export-oriented countries. In all 
regions, the majority of LSLT´s appear to have taken place 
in the last 5 years, particularly those involved in agricultural 
production (food, fuel, feed or fibre).
3. To assess the consequences of LSLT´s (at least for 
those land deals which have begun (1)) a review of the 
empirical and theoretical literature was undertaken in three 
key areas: Efficiency/Productivity (including environmental 
effects of different forms of production), Transparency and 
Compensation frameworks. 
a) Efficiency/Productivity: Although the traditional agricul-
tural economics literature has praised the efficiency of 
small farming units (along with their potential to re-
duce poverty and contribute to the development of ru-
ral economies), technological developments have also 
made large-farming complexes able to reduce supervi-
sion/monitoring costs as well as overall labour costs and 
transaction costs associated to agro-industrial process-
ing and export of agricultural commodities. As the world 
is becoming more urbanized the large farming complex 
represents advantages particularly in land abundant 
and/or agricultural labour-scarce economies. The envi-
ronmental costs of mono-cultivation however are highly 
criticized despite their higher yields. 
b) Transparency: The reviewed literature suggests that most 
LSLT´s take place behind closed doors and with poor 
mechanisms to consult the local communities. The latter 
has resulted into several forms of conflict and displace-
ments, particularly in African countries. This also affects 
the quality of available data on LSLT´s.
c) Compensation:  This is another issue of LSLT´s which has 
been highly criticized in both the media and the academ-
ic literature. There is evidence from different land deals 
that fair compensation schemes have not been negoti-
ated, particularly for female-headed farm households or 
individuals without well-defined property rights. The lat-
ter also includes the regulation of adequate use of other 
resources such as water or access to communal land. 
In conclusion, the recent wave of LSLT´s serves as a reminder 
to reflect on how to organize agricultural sectors in order 
to fulfil food and energy security challenges. While in land-
abundant countries the case for large farming complexes 
may find support in the literature, the thorniest issue is 
related to areas where agricultural labour is abundant 
and (semi)subsistence farming is widespread since it is in 
these areas where a large percentage of the food-poor are 
also located. The latter implies a conscientious decision on 
how smallholders will be integrated, displaced from these 
activities and/or re-absorbed into other sectors. At the same 
time, it is necessary to reflect on the adequate agricultural 
practices to preserve and maintain natural resources 
and the role of different agricultural units to improve 
productivity preserve biodiversity and secure environmental 
sustainability. 
Figure 1: Number of LSLT´s (deals) per investment sectors per year
Source: Land Matrix (Accessed March 2013)
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9I n t r o d u c t i o n
The debate around the recent wave of (International) Large-
Scale Land Transactions (LSLT) worldwide is connected to 
food security challenges. While in low income countries, 
hunger and poverty constrain access to sufficient and 
nutritious food for over 1 billion people in our planet (2); 
in high income countries the discussion is focused on 
aspects of long-term food availability and avoidance of 
price volatility in international markets (Saravia-Matus et al, 
2012a). Similarly, the question of land access and land use 
is different for low and high income societies or between 
types of land investors and recipient economies. 
For the case of (foreign or national) investors the objectives 
may be diverse but among them the following may be cited: 
i) secure food supply and reduce interactions in highly vol-
atile food commodity markets, 
ii) engage in the bio-fuel producing sector 
iii) invest/speculate with agricultural commodities in a glo-
bal financial context of crisis where investment options 
have become less attractive. 
For the host countries that are receiving but in most cases are 
also actively offering land deals, the situation is somewhat 
contradictory on theoretical and practical grounds. It is 
argued that the entrance of large-agro-complexes into their 
rural economies mostly characterized by medium or small 
(semi)subsistence producers will provide great spill over 
effects as well as long-term employment opportunities. 
However, the latter has rarely been reported in the 
avalanche of newspaper clips on this topic where in fact an 
opposite situation is usually portrayed: rural displacement, 
lack of consent for land acquisition & leasing in communal 
properties, reduction of rural livelihood alternatives, etc. 
There is abundant (policy and academic) literature 
indicating that if adequate and binding codes of conduct 
and governance structures are established, large scale land 
investment projects can yield positive results for all involved 
stakeholders. Clearly, not enough time has elapsed (since the 
wave of LSLT´s has started in the mid 2000’s and has really 
become more intense in the past three to five years) to prove 
this statement as right or wrong. But something that is made 
implicit throughout the entire discussion of LSLT´s is that a 
large farm structure will constitute a more efficient form of 
production particularly in areas which report a low density 
of population (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). The problem 
from an analytical viewpoint is that few empirical studies 
on efficiency measurement of large-scale farms (in different 
crop systems and agricultural technologies) with respect to 
other farm sizes are available. When this type of assumption 
remains unchallenged, the position of smallholders from a 
socio-economic perspective is weakened. In the present 
report, both empirical and theoretical issues concerning the 
differences in terms of efficiency/productivity between large 
and small farms will be considered.
From an environmental outlook, however, the academic and 
policy literature is less ambiguous and evidence is widespread 
on the risks associated to extensive mono-cultivation, loss of 
biodiversity or abusive use of natural resources which tend 
to occur in highly mechanized mono-cultivated areas (UNEP 
GEAS, 2011). In this respect, the increasing competition for 
resources such as land and water which is resulting from the 
current wave of farmland acquisition and leasing is leaving 
small-scale farmers not only in a less competitive position 
but also in an even more vulnerable situation regarding 
food security. This takes us back to the starting point of 
this introduction: food security and the management of key 
resources such as land and water imply different challenges 
in low and high income countries. While in the latter, farmland 
investment connects to the long term availability of food at 
affordable prices, in the former, where rural population is 
dependent on farming for survival, land is a life strategic 
asset. Access to natural resources (such as land, water and 
forests) is essential to the 2.5 billion people who depend 
on small-scale farming to produce food (at very low yields) 
for their own consumption and income (FAO, 2012). The 
question which remains to be asked is what type of resource 
allocation and sustainability plan (for efficient food & fuel 
production) should be supported in order to secure food 
access and availability to the planet’s increasing population 
and consumption needs. After all, it should be reminded 
that the expected 2 billion increase of the world population 
towards 2050 is to take place in low income areas.
In the present report the objective is to present a structured 
overview of what the recent wave of (international) large-
scale land transactions entail and what are the potential 
consequences for food security worldwide (making special 
notes for both investor and host country populations which 
in some cases it may be different agents within the same 
country supported or not by a foreign player). With this 
purpose in mind, the report is structured into two main 
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sections. In the first part, the reasons behind the scale and 
speed of the number of (international) large-scale land 
transactions will be addressed, followed by the differences 
with previous forms of land transactions along with the 
identification of new players and their specific aims. In 
addition, the dimensions of LSLT´s are assessed by looking 
how they differ between three main regions: Africa, Black 
Sea region and Latin America. In the second part, three main 
issues will be discussed in order to assess how efficient/
productive, transparent and socially beneficial are the large-
scale land investment projects both locally and globally. 
This will be made on a theoretical basis (discussing main 
differences between large and small farming) and also by 
relying on selected empirical findings since many of the 
LSLT projects are still in an early stage of execution. Finally, 
conclusions are presented with an overview of potential 
advantages and disadvantages of large-scale farming in 
terms of food security. The focus is placed on the assessment 
of a future agricultural sector which is dominated by large-
complexes versus other investment models which attempt 
to explicitly integrate or at least consider the prospects 
of the 500 million small farm-households worldwide who 
are among the food insecure in low income countries (FAO, 
2012).
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( I n t e r n a t i o n a l )  L a r g e - S c a l e  L a n d  T r a n s a c t i o n s  ( L S L T ´ s ) :
A  n e w  p h e n o m e n o n
1.1 Background
While there has been a long history of consolidation of large 
farms during pre-and post-colonial ruling, the latter were 
followed by some attempts towards land redistribution (in 
the form of agrarian reforms) in several low income areas; a 
trend which now appears to be in reversal given the current 
wave of LSLT´s and the decline of public investment to 
support smallholders.  
Official Development Assistance for the agricultural sector 
has lost share of overall aid over time from around 15% in 
1970’s to 5% in 2007 (GTZ, 2009). According to FAO (2012) 
this decline in agricultural investment has contributed to 
reduce the positive evolution of yields and performance in 
marginalized areas where governments’ public agricultural 
spending is also limited.  Moreover, Da Silva and Mhlanga 
(2009) highlight that in many African countries commercial 
bank lending to agriculture is small (around or less than 
10% of portfolio) and interest rates are relatively high. 
Despite the positive effects of microfinance loans, more 
resources are needed to support long term capital formation 
in agriculture in low income countries.  According to FAO 
(2010) around 83 billion annually would be required in order 
to assist developing country agricultural sectors in feeding 
their growing populations towards 2050. 
In this context of declining growth rate of agricultural yields 
and increasing demand, the recent large-scale land deals 
are considered strategic deals from a business perspective 
given the worldwide challenges on food security. At the 
same time, these deals could also serve as relevant tools to 
strengthen agricultural sectors in under-invested areas. In 
other words, there is a new potential to make a significant 
contribution to bridging the investment gap in low income 
country agriculture (Hallam, 2011). The question therefore 
is not whether these land transactions should contribute to 
meeting investment needs but how to maximize the benefits 
and minimize the inherent risks for all stakeholders involved. 
In this sense, stakeholders are not only the investors or the 
local rural communities but  also world population in general 
(World Bank, 2010). Other aspects to consider include any 
externality effects in other sectors within the recipient 
country, impact on international trade relations and the 
environmental sustainability.
1.2 Definition of the recent wave of LSLT´s 
The increase of land transactions worldwide has been 
denominated in various fashions:  “outsourcing’s third 
wave(3)”, “global race for farmland”,  “commercial agriculture”, 
“land grab”, “land rush” (The Economist, The Guardian, BBC 
News, Wikipedia, UNEP-Global Environmental Alert Service 
(4)), “agro-imperialism” or “neo-colonialism” (Via Campesina 
(5)). For the World Bank (2010) a key publication on this 
issue is entitled: “Rising Global Interest in Farmland”. Terms 
are thus as varied as the many publications and authors 
belonging to activist groups, NGO’s, think tanks, academics, 
international organizations or the media. In many cases, 
particularly for NGO´s or the media groups, definitions 
attempt to portray the existing power imbalance between 
transacting parties.
However, in an attempt to gain some distance from the 
debate on whether the phenomenon refers to pure land grabs 
or land investments, the term “(Foreign) Direct Investment” 
(FDI) is reviewed. According to OECD (1999), Foreign Direct 
Investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest in an economy other than that of the investor. 
The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the targeted 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the 
management of said enterprise. Direct investment involves 
both the initial transaction between the two entities and all 
subsequent capital transactions between them and among 
affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. 
Conventionally, FDI was conceived as a form of international 
inter-firm cooperation that involves a significant equity stake 
in or effective management control of foreign enterprises (De 
Mello Jr., 2007). Another similar but more recent definition of 
FDI which introduces a land focus is given by the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
1 (International) Large-Scale 
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(GTZ, 2009):  FDI in land by a foreign company or state is 
based on a lasting interest in taking control over land use 
rights. The transaction includes either rights of land-use or 
land-ownership. The land-use rights are generally valid for a 
limited period and can possibly be extended. 
Considering the definitions of FDI and the socio-economic 
particularities of the asset transacted, the term LSLT or 
(International) Large-Scale Land Transactions is introduced 
and used throughout this document. The term international 
is presented in parenthesis because some of the recorded 
land deals have taken place between agents of the same 
country or continent. In other words, it is not always the case 
that a foreign investor is involved. An emphasis is placed 
on the matter of ¨transactions¨ because these may include 
acquisitions, leasing agreements, or other forms of business 
models ultimately seeking to secure the control and use 
of a strategic asset for food security: land (which implicitly 
includes another increasingly scarce resource: water). Lastly, 
the idea that the land deals take place largely between 
private enterprises or actors is not incorporated into the term 
LSLT.
In the following sub-sections the aim is to understand 
how the current wave of LSLT´s can no longer be strictly 
considered under the traditional meaning of Foreign or 
National Direct Investment. This is because these recent land 
deals possess new characteristics (in scale, speed and focus) 
and more importantly they take place in a new social and 
environmental scenario. Consequently, the main objective is 
to unravel the connections to local and global food security 
situation today and in the near future as a result of the on-
going transformations in the agricultural sectors of countries 
involved in these types of large land transactions. 
1.3 Differences with previous forms of (Foreign) Direct 
Investments (FDI) in land 
Three main differences between the current LSLT´s and 
previous FDI in land can be highlighted: (Scoones, 2010a 
2010b; Hall, 2011, The Economist, 2012):
1.3.1. Scale & Speed 
According to the Land Matrix Project (6) since the year 2000 
to 2012 around 50 million hectares of land have been 
negotiated under about one thousand deals. Currently, the 
Land Matrix dataset includes only deals above 1000 ha that 
have been verified by different contributors in situ. 
There are however, other sources indicating rather larger 
figures at regional level. For example, Friis & Rosenberg 
(2010) indicate that in Africa alone 51 to 63 million hectares 
were negotiated between 2008 and 2010. Another estimate 
for Africa between 2008 and 2009 is that of 39.7 million 
hectares (Arezki et al, 2012), roughly the size of a country 
like Ukraine over a period of one year (Cotula, 2012). The 
Land Matrix on the other hand allocates around 18 million 
hectares negotiated under LSLT´s in Africa. 
In all cases, available databases are dependent on news or 
local reports and it is acknowledged that the secretive nature 
of deals is the main obstacle to having definite calculations, 
along with the definition of what constitutes an approved 
deal (whether production has started or only land has been 
enclosed or upon signature). See Table 1 for an overview of 
different sources for aggregate land areas acquired, based 
on media reports (based on Cotula, 2012 with extended 
method description).
For the present report, the most conservative estimations of 
the Land Matrix Database will be used as the reported data 
is said to be subject to in-situ cross-checking measures and 
only verified deals are kept (7). Each record in the database 
is assigned a reliability code. Information is sought for over 
30 fields for each deal, but for legal reasons only 8 fields 
are published. Where possible, data is distributed to partners 
in host countries for cross-checking. This may be achieved 
through personal interviews, direct personal knowledge of 
the transaction, or access to research that has not yet been 
published.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 that contain data emerging from Land 
Matrix project for LSLT´s between 2000 and 2011. For the 
years 2010 and 2011, however, land deals are considered to 
be still under a process of on-going collection and verification 
of related data. This delay in data collection/verification 
can lead to potential gaps in the Land Matrix database, 
particularly for regions which have received less media 
attention such as the Black Sea Region and Latin America. 
For instance, in the Black Sea region it is difficult to account 
for specific transactions between investors and agro-holding 
shareholders which can be substantial (of around 300 ha) 
but below the Land Matrix threshold of 1000 ha deals. In 
the case of Latin America, LSLT´s appear to frequently take 
place through partnerships or associations which may include 
several deals of less than 1000 ha, thus escaping the radar 
of the Land Matrix project. There is thus a gap which could be 
potentially filled with further scrutiny of media resources. In 
this respect, initiatives such the Europe Media Monitor (EMM) 
of the EC-JRC could be used for this purpose (http://emm.
newsbrief.eu/overview.html). Another related initiative is that 
of the FAO Policy Decision Analysis (FAPDA) which seeks 
to enhance collection and dissemination of information on 
policy decisions to policy makers but also as a public good 
(http://www.fao.org/economic/fapda/tool/Main.html )
According to the World Bank (2010) an average annual 
expansion of global agricultural land was less than 4 million 
ha per year but between 2006 and 2009, this almost tripled 
to 11.3 million hectares per year (an increase also illustrated 
by Land Matrix data). 70% of land demands during this time 
period were said to be in Sub-Saharan Africa where in 2009 
the demand for land was equivalent to more than 20 years 
of previous land expansion (Deininger, 2011). The issue that 
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three-fourths of the world´s land deals have taken place 
in Africa is also highlighted by Sparks (2012), World Bank, 
(2010) and Global Land Project (2010). Although according 
to the Land Matrix (2012) the area acquired in Africa 
corresponds to 35% of total land and a similar percentage 
is also said to have been negotiated in South East Asia 
(according to records up to December 2012).
Despite the discrepancies in terms of distribution of LSLT´s 
around the world, it is recognized in most data sources 
that the speed and the scale of land deals have not been 
constant and that some peaks emerged in the last decade. 
According to the Land Matrix there was a peak in the number 
of deals registered between 2005 and 2006 and then again 
in 2009-2010 (Figure 2 & 3). In the Land Matrix there were 
924 documented deals (as reported in December 2012); all 
of them accounting for transactions above 1000 ha (See 
Figure 4 for an overview of where these deals took place). 
While the data for 2010 and 2011 is considered to be under 
verification and collection processes, academic sources differ 
on whether there has been an actual decline in the number 
of deals in the last couple of years. 
According to Sapelli (2012), the speed and magnitude of 
land deals during the first quarter of 2012 was of 2.5 million 
negotiated hectares, implying that the intensity is in fact 
maintained. However, Anseeuw et al (2012) have reported 
that the peak year for LSLT´s was reached in 2009 and that 
the number of deals and extension of land acquired has 
been slowed down since then, but continues. The latter would 
also be supported by Land Matrix data if the current data 
collected for 2010 and 2011 is not updated and the levels 
Table 1: Overview of different sources for aggregate land areas acquired, based on media reports
Land Area in Ha Coverage Time Period Database & Method
51-63 million 
27 countries 
in Africa
2008-2010
Global Land Project – Systematic inventory of 
media reports included in the International Land 
Coalition (ILC) Blog
56.6 million (of which 
39.7 in Africa))
Global
1 October 2008-31 
August 2009
Systematic inventory of media reports 
included in the International non-governmental 
organization  GRAIN blog – Dataset used by 
Deininger (2011), World Bank (2010)
48,829,193 million Global 2000 to 2011
The Land Matrix includes deals that are made 
for agricultural production (for food or agro 
fuel production), timber extraction, carbon 
trading, mineral extraction, conservation, 
and tourism. Largely based on IFPRI´S site 
(www.farmlandgrab.org), ILC´s site (www.
commercialpressureonland.org), media and 
direct individual reports.
Source: Cotula (2012) and own elaboration
Figure 2: Number of deals (2000-2011)
Source: Land Matrix (Accessed March 2013)
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are maintained as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. According to 
Deininger (2011) a possible decline in the number of deals 
may be observed since LSLT´s have been pre-negotiated or 
even signed but their implementation phase is postponed. 
He indicates that this is the case for 50% of African LSLT´s. 
It is also possible that the apparent decline in land deals 
is attributed to the fact that major investing countries such 
as China have experienced reduced growth rates in their 
economies in the last couple of years.
In terms of monetary value, it has been estimated by the 
media that these recent wave of land deals amount to 
Figure 4: Overview of total number of land deals by sub-region and region (2000-2011) 
Note: Total number of deals 924
Source: Land Matrix (Accessed March 2013)
Figure 3: Deals by size in hectares (x 100.000) (2000-2011) 
Source: Land Matrix (Accessed March 2013)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
42
38
34
29
25
21
17
13
8
4
0
HECTARES
DATA UNDER
COLLECTION
AND
VERIFICATION
Eastern Africa
South-East Asia
South America
South Asia
Western Africa
Central Africa
Central America
Eastern Europe
Northern Africa
Eastern Asia
Southern Africa
Australia and New Zeland
Melanesia
Middle East
260
216 
132
114
98
27
18
18
18
12
3
342
150
408
18 5 1
1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
5
Africa
Asia
America
Europe
Oceania
Middle East
15
20 – 30 billion USD that is at least ten times as much an 
emergency package for agriculture recently announced by 
the World Bank (The Economist, 2012). Other academic 
sources do not venture into calculating the overall value of 
such investments given their still early phase of development.
The size of deals has also increased. A big land deal used to 
be around 100 000 hectares and between 2002 and 2003 
the total number of hectares transacted annually hardly 
reached this amount. In recent years, however, the largest 
land deals started to comprise 400 000 to 1 000 000 
hectares. For instance, in Sudan, South Korea signed deals 
for 690 000 hectares, Egypt has secured a similar amount 
in that country while the United Arab Emirates has acquired 
400 000 hectares. About one fifth of the Sudan arable land 
has been set aside for Arab governments (Land Matrix 2012; 
The Economist, 2012).
The Land Matrix Database also contains seven mega-deals 
ranging between 1.1 and 2.8 million hectares. For example, 
China secured the right to grow palm oil for biofuel on 2.8 
million hectares in Congo, which would be the world’s largest 
oil palm plantation (The Economist, 2012; Hall 2011; Land 
Matrix, 2012). According to Hall (2011) Chinese corporations 
also seek a similar amount of land for biofuel production in 
Zambia. 
1.3.2. A preference for food and flexible crops 
Another difference of the current LSLT´s with respect to the 
previous forms of FDI in farmland is the relative abandonment 
of the so called “banana republics” business models (8). The 
latter were to a great extent organized as large complexes 
for export of specialty crops (9) such as fruit, tea or peanuts. 
But nowadays the focus is geared towards crops which can 
be used for food, feed or biofuels (that is, largely staple 
crops and oilseeds). 
According to the Land Matrix Database (as of November 
2012), food (staple) production accounts for 34% of 
investments, non-food production crops account for 26% 
and the so-called flexible crops which can be destined for 
food or biofuel (soybean, sugarcane and oil palm) account 
for 23%, the rest is under the category of “multiple uses”. 
Sapelli (2012) offers a different classification to land deals 
between 2007 and 2011: 52% related to food, 20% related 
to biofuels and 8% related to livestock. While FAO (2009b) 
identifies 40% of food crops, 21% cash crops, 20% biofuels 
and the remainder plantation forestry, livestock and game 
reserves (Figure 5). Deininger (2011) indicates that 37 per 
cent of land transactions directed towards food crops.
Although the ultimate purpose of LSLT´s continues to be 
the export of a large percentage of farm output (either for 
food supply or for industrial transformation as in the case 
of rubber of biofuels), the dominant commodity profile has 
been swapped.  In earlier forms of FDI in farmland, the 
emphasis was placed on fruits or cash crops which could only 
be grown in the tropics (banana, cocoa, coffee, tea, etc.), but 
now a focus on basic staple foods and oilseeds has emerged 
strengthening the linkages to the agro-energy sector. 
Leahy (2009) argues that “rich countries are buying poor 
countries’ soil fertility, water and sun to ship food and 
fuel back home, in a kind of neo-colonial dynamic”. This 
¨exploitative nature¨ of land deals is usually seen as a 
constant of both the current wave of LSLT´s and previous 
forms of FDI in farmland. Another one is that of forceful 
displacements which have been reported in the media 
(addressed in sub -sequent sections 2.2 and 2.3). However, 
with the increasing media pressure and the recent FAO 
and World Bank attempts (10) to regulate responsible land 
investments it may be expected that investors probably start 
focusing as well on the public perceptions surrounding their 
LSLT´s.
1.3.3. Involved parties and actors
There is also a change in the nature of parties involved 
in LSLT´s. Before, it was customary that the deals were 
undertaken between private enterprises or individuals. The 
latter still takes place but nowadays, governments are 
starting to play an essential role in bringing about LSLT´s 
both from the side of the investor and the host country. 
Details of key drivers of different players are presented in 
section 1.4.2. At this point it is important to first identify who 
are the emergent players.
In this respect, Sovereign Wealth Funds (state-owned funds 
which generally originate from current account surpluses, 
exports of oil and other commodities or manufactured 
goods, fiscal surpluses, public savings or privatisation 
receipts) and other Sovereign Investment Vehicles (such 
as: Reserve investment corporations, Development funds, 
Pension reserve funds or State-owned companies) have 
been used to fund several LSLT´s. The latter takes place 
under the assumption that the land deals will serve the 
political objectives of the respective country and thus public 
funds can be used. For example, the Qatar Investment 
Authority is reported to have established joint venture funds 
with the governments of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Philippines to secure food imports. Similar steps have been 
taken by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund where 
Saudi officials have visited several target countries such as: 
Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Philippines, 
South Africa or Sudan (GTZ, 2009). State-owned enterprises 
are also very active players among which we may find the 
Chinese Corporation or the International Water and Electric 
Corporation with holdings in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Saturnino et al (2012) indicate that domestic or trans-
national capital is also taking part in land acquisition which 
includes companies from Vietnam and Thailand investing in 
neighbouring Cambodia or Brazilian companies investing in 
their own country as well as in other parts of  South America 
(the so called ¨brasiguayos¨ for Brazilian land buyers in 
Paraguay). This implies that investors may not necessary 
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Figure 5: Profile of LSLT ´s
come from the distant ¨north¨. Despite this trend, a number 
of often small European Union companies are involved 
sometimes with support from their national governments in 
securing land abroad (UNCTAD, 2009). There are also large 
companies such as the Swedish investment groups Black 
Earth Farming or Alpcot-Agro who bought rights to 331 300 
and 128 000 respectively in Russia, another one is Landkom 
(UK) which has acquired 100 000 ha in Ukraine. 
According to Hall (2011) European and North American banks 
and financial investors are actively seeking alternatives to 
volatile international financial markets. Some examples 
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include Morgan Stanley (40 000 hectares in Ukraine) or 
Renaissance Capital (a Russian investment house which has 
acquired rights to 300 000 ha in Ukraine). More details on 
the different dimensions of LSLT´s, from a contractual point 
of view will be given below in section 1.5. 
1.4 Why is this wave of LSLT´s happening now?
The main traits of LSLT´s and their differences with previous 
forms of FDI in land have been listed above but it is relevant 
to explore what drives and what has allowed for the wave 
of LSLT´S to take place. Saturnino et al (2012) point out 
that a convergence of global crises (financial, environmental, 
energy, food) in recent years has contributed to the dramatic 
revaluation of, and rush to control, land, especially land 
located in the “global south”.  
It can also be argued that the context of increased demand 
for food, fuel and fibre that results from higher demographic 
pressure and the reduced investment opportunities in 
traditional portfolios, are factors that have contributed to 
accentuate the competition for limited natural resources. 
It is interesting to note as well that among key investors, 
there are countries which have managed to increase their 
overall wealth in the last decades and which foresee an 
increasing demographic trend along with enhanced family 
incomes, namely China, United Arab Emirates and other 
south-east Asian countries. Interestingly, these economies 
have experienced since the late 1990´s and beginning of the 
2000´s increasing economic growth rates that have allowed 
for surpluses (reflected in their sovereign wealth funds, 
discussed in the following sub-section). Only in the last few 
years have these players seen their growth rates reduced as 
a result of the global economic recession. The latter could 
be connected to the apparent decline in the number of land 
deals in the last couple of years, although the amount of 
available sovereign wealth funds (SWF´s) is expected to still 
show positive growth in the coming years.
  
From a more general perspective, it is plausible to argue 
that the phenomenon of LSLT´s and the above mentioned 
expansions and crises can be interpreted via economic cycle 
theories, such as those developed by Braudel, Kuznets, 
Kondratiev, Schumpeter, Kitchin, Juglar, etc… While a detailed 
examination of the these theories goes beyond the purpose 
of the present study, it is maybe useful to recall that among 
the theorists in this field Sweezy (1953) has emphasized 
that in capitalist systems there is a point where a condition 
of over-production and over-accumulation is reached which 
consequently translates into economic stagnation, reduction 
of profits and increase of unemployment (11). Like in every 
cycle, a recovery in demand is expected in due course. 
However, the next expansion phase does not appear ready 
to start. In the case of LSLT´s, It could be interpreted that 
funds (resulting from previous periods of over-production 
and over-accumulation) may have been partially allocated 
into the acquisition and leasing of natural resources which 
have great strategic value in the context of food security. In 
fact, according to UNCTAD (2009) FDI flows into agriculture 
have quadrupled in the last three decades.  For the case 
of countries which have accumulated wealth in the same 
time period and which are at a relative disadvantage in 
the production of agricultural goods (given their reduced 
availability of land and water at a domestic level) LSLT´s 
have become a rather attractive investment option for their 
SWF´s. Moreover, LSLT´s would be in line with strategies 
to secure food access and affordability for their rising 
populations in the medium and long term.
1.4.1 The role of Sovereign Investment Vehicles
According to the latest UNCTAD report on Foreign Direct 
Investment, Sovereign Wealth Funds (12) destined to FDI in 
2011 represented 125 billion dollars, or about 8% of total 
FDI flows at world level for that year; with about one quarter 
of sovereign funds destined to FDI projects in low or middle 
income economies. The report also reveals that the primary 
sector (agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining, etc.) was the 
sector with the largest increase from 140 billion in 2010 to 
200 billion in 2011, increasing its share of total FDI flows 
from 11 to 14%.  
The use of Sovereign Wealth Funds for FDI purposes was 
considered small given that they account for approximately 
5 000 billion dollars (UNCTAD, 2012). According to data 
from the Sovereign Wealth Institute and TheCityUK, SWF´s 
at global level actually reached 4.800 billion in 2011 and 
they are expected to grow 8% to 5.200 billion towards the 
end of 2012, following a 9% increase in 2011. (See Table 2 
for a summary of the largest SWF). According to the same 
source, there is an additional $7.200 billion held in other 
sovereign investment vehicles, such as pension reserve 
funds, development funds and state-owned corporations’ 
funds and $8.100 billion in official foreign exchange 
reserves. Taken together, governments such as UAE, China, 
Norway, Kuwait, Singapore, Australia, Russia or Libya, among 
other emerging economies, have access to a pool of funds 
totalling $20.1 trillion dollars. This amount is smaller than 
other global assets under management such as pension 
($30 trillion), investment ($24.5 trillion) or mutual funds 
(23.4 trillion), but definitely much larger than private equity 
($2.6 trillion) or hedge funds  ($1.8 trillion) (Figure 6). 
1.4.2 Key drivers of LSLT´s 
At a more detailed level, it is possible to identify different 
motivations driving LSLT´S, although they are all rooted to 
food and energy security challenges in one way or another. 
In the case of investors, three factors or motives can be put 
forward to explain their land acquisition strategies: 
The first one and most important factor is related to securing 
food supply channels for their growing populations. In this 
respect, when they set up large-scale land transactions and 
farming complexes whose output is imported back to the 
domestic economy these governments are directly avoiding 
international market transactions. In other words, there 
is an evasion of price volatility particularly from rich but 
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agriculturally speaking resource-poor countries who want 
to avoid dependence on international markets as well as to 
safeguard their access to natural resources in the medium 
to long term. 
Investor countries may thus maximize profits through the 
reduction of transactions costs related to highly volatile 
agricultural markets and an increased reliance on LSLT´s 
to secure food provision at low or stable prices. According 
to Anderson and Nelgen (2012) export bans are established 
to protect domestic consumers from the effects of the 
international food price spike (examples in 2011 were bans 
on grain exports in Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Russia—all of 
which were lifted before the end of the year). But this type of 
mechanism exacerbates price spikes (by restricting supplies 
in the international market) and affect the international 
welfare transfer associated with that spike in terms of 
trade (which defines how much a country needs to export 
in exchange for a given import volume). In the same line, 
Anderson and Nelgen (2012) emphasize that governments 
of food-importing countries by lowering their food import 
restrictions (or even switching to food-import subsidies) also 
contribute to exacerbating the international price spikes—
which means that it weakens the initial attempt by food-
exporting countries to shield their consumers. 
In other words, it appears that most investor countries have 
an unprecedented reluctance to depend on world markets 
to fulfil their food needs and prefer more secure and direct 
supply channels. Hallam (2011) in fact uses the word “fear” 
to refer to countries´ attitude towards volatile prices and 
uncertain, unstable international agricultural markets. The 
explanation to this attitude is based not only on the emerging 
price volatility which has led to increased food prices (as 
most oil-exporting Arab countries, for instance, can afford 
the increase) but to the possibility of having no opportunity 
to purchase food (due to export bans). It is in any case, a 
matter of protecting and securing availability of food in the 
medium and long term for their populations. 
Table 2: Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds (2011)
Funds
Assets under 
management
($ BN)
Country Inception year
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 627 UAE-Abu Dhabi 1976
SAFE Investment Company 568 China 1997
Government Pension Fund – Global 560 Norway 1990
SAMA Foreign Holdings 473 Saudi Arabia n/a
China Investment Authority 410 China 2007
Kuwait Investment Authority 296 Kuwait 1953
Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio 293 China 1993
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 248 Singapore 1981
Temasek Holdings 157 Singapore 1974
National Social Security Fund 135 China 2000
National Welfare Fund 114 Russia 2008
Tuatara Investment Authority 85 Qatar 2005
Australia Future Fund 73 Australia 2004
Libyan Investment Authority 70 UAE-Dubai 2006
International Petroleum Investment Company 65 Libya 2006
Others 626
Total 4,800
Source: TheCityUK (2012) 
Figure 6: Size of Total Sovereign Investment Funds 
Vs. Other Global Assets (2011 in Trillion US$)
Source: TheCityUK (2012)
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These countries, especially China, have realized that there is 
a growing pressure due to increasing population and income 
on food supplies at world level while access to key resources 
such as land and water is becoming highly constrained 
and competitive. According to Hall (2011) there are other 
agents interested in serving the Chinese markets such as 
Indian, Korean, South African and Taiwanese multinational 
companies who engage in farmland acquisition to supply 
the Chinese agricultural commodity needs besides fulfilling 
their own demand for food, fodder and fibre that allows 
them to maintain growth rates and be less dependent on 
world markets. As stated above, this demand pressure for 
agricultural commodities and the access to natural resources 
for their production is the key driver among investors with 
large funds at governmental level.
The second factor is linked to the emerging policies to foster 
biofuel production. These initiatives are usually in line with 
government commitment to reducing pollution and usage 
of fossil-based energy. The increase in demand for biofuels 
has potentially exerted pressures both on world prices for 
agricultural commodities and on land use, i.e. how much 
planting area could be diverted from producing other crops 
to those used as feedstock for the production of bio-fuels 
(FAO, 2009). Between 2008 and 2004 the total area under 
biofuel crops (estimated at 36 million hectares) doubled 
(World Bank, 2010) and as mentioned above, about one 
fourth of recorded farmland investment deals in the land 
matrix database are destined to crops which can serve for 
biofuel production. Moreover, not only high income countries 
are committed to extending the use of biofuels, such as the 
case of EU or USA. Brazil is one of the major producers of 
ethanol and smaller countries like Colombia have established 
by government decree that by 2016, all vehicles should 
function with biofuels. For this purpose, there is an aggressive 
Colombian strategy to attract investors to cultivate large 
extension of sugar cane and palm oil and set up processing 
plants (Proexport, Colombia 2012). In this respect, it is 
mainly the private agro-energy sector enterprises that have 
responded to these incentives by engaging in LSLT´s.  
The third factor is connected to financial speculation 
(anticipating growing land prices) (GTZ, 2009). With the 
collapse of credit markets and the on-going crisis, investors 
find in agricultural resources and commodities an alternative 
way to expand and diversify their portfolios. The objective 
is to increase shareholder value via benefitting of rising 
food prices. The latter is  based on the widely recognized 
interdependencies in the food, bioenergy and energy price 
systems (Ciaian and Kancs, 2011)(13) in a context of 
growing population, changes in consumption patterns, 
increasing climate variability and declining agricultural 
yields. As a result, there are international corporations not 
directly connected to agriculture which have undertaken 
farmland acquisition or leasing agreements to profit from 
the increasing challenges faced in the agricultural sector. 
According to Scoones (2010b) for a hedge fund or a pension 
fund (such as the TIAA-CREF in the US) considering to make 
an investment in farmland acquisition, food scarcity or rising 
prices are a positive sign which makes their investment 
decision in farmland even more attractive and safe.  
Regarding host countries, it appears that many governments 
are taking a rather proactive campaign to attract LSLT´s. For 
example, in Africa there have been clear efforts to promote 
the existence of so called “unused lands” or “idle land” 
usually under state or unrecognized communal property 
systems. In July 2009 the government of Ethiopia reportedly 
marked out 1.6 million hectares of land extendable to 2.7 
million, for investors willing to develop commercial farms 
(Cotula, 2011). The argument is that there are advantages 
that come with LSLT´s related to economies of scale in 
production, technology transfer, employment creation and 
the construction of related rural infrastructure. In any case, 
the main issue is that host countries who are usually poor 
and eager to capture any type of investment funds coming 
to their agricultural sectors. Not all countries, however, fall 
into this category. Concern about the potential negative 
effects of LSLT´s has given rise to draft legislation to limit 
land purchases by foreigners in a number of countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine (Arezki, et al 2012). 
In Argentina and Brazil there are also prohibitions for 
foreigners to acquires large tracts of land on or near borders. 
But if foreigners can use nationals as intermediaries, such 
measures do little to address the underlying issues and may 
exacerbate governance challenges by limiting competition 
(ibid.) 
In this respect, it is possible to find classification of target 
countries in the literature. For example, according to GTZ 
(2009) target countries can be clustered into two groups:
• In the first segment we find countries which have large 
availability of arable land and not enough resources to uti-
lize them, including inappropriate infrastructure, but char-
acterized with a strong focus towards export agriculture 
(i.e. Brazil, Argentina, Russia, Ukraine). Their main motiva-
tion is to secure capital flow into agriculture which is an 
important and growing sector in the economy. 
• In a second group, there are countries which expect to fos-
ter development through large-scale land transaction in 
agriculture. They are usually characterized by weak gov-
ernance, unclear land markets, political disturbances, low 
input costs of land and labour, large presence of subsist-
ence farming and favourable conditions in terms of cli-
mate, soil and water access (Sudan, Madagascar, Mali, 
Cambodia, Laos). 
A common point in most of the target countries is that a 
substantial percentage of the rural population is currently 
reporting declining average farm size (or an increase in 
the proportion of farmland cultivated in small holdings), 
deteriorated agricultural infrastructure and very often a high 
degree of food insecurity (Scoones, 2010a; Lipton, 2006). 
There are sometimes clear contradictions in the strategies 
to attract LSLT´s within target countries. One example is 
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Ethiopia where Saudi investors are spending 100 million USD 
to raise cereals (wheat, barley and rice) on land leased to 
them by the government. The investors are exempt from tax 
in the first few years and may export the entire crop back 
home. Meanwhile, the World Food Programme is spending 
almost the same amount as investors (116 m) providing 
230 000 tonnes of food aid between 2007 and 2011 to the 
estimated 4.6 million Ethiopians threatened by hunger and 
malnutrition (The Economist, 2012). Another example is that 
of Sudan, a net food importer country that relies on food aid 
from international donors yet still manages to grow wheat 
for Saudi Arabia, tomatoes for Jordanian Army and sorghum 
– a typical Sudanese staple – for camels in the United Arab 
Emirates (Kugelman and Levenstein, 2009)
Many NGO´s, media reports and the UN representative for 
food security (De Schutter, 2011) argue that host countries 
are in an unfavourable position to negotiate LSLT´s. Three 
obstacles are usually highlighted:
 
• A first obstacle refers to the fact that poor agriculture-based 
countries who seek to attract foreign capital in order to de-
velop their infrastructures are competing for the arrival of 
direct investment. This fosters a tendency to lower the level 
of requirements imposed on investors, whether these re-
late to the compensations owed, to the creation of employ-
ment or the payment of taxes. De Schutter (2011) points 
out that the development of a basic regional framework to 
define how the rights of land users should be protected, the 
local communities consulted and which business models 
to pursue according to investment types could significantly 
strengthen the bargaining position of host countries.
• A second obstacle resides in the weak capacity of host 
states to manage the investments in farmland and to regu-
late the wide-ranging impacts such investments may pro-
duce. For this purpose, it is important for them to strength-
en security of tenure, implement social and environmental 
standards, establish appropriate consultation with local 
communities, screen investors’ projects and set up valid 
dispute-resolution mechanisms among others. 
• A third obstacle which host countries face is that transac-
tions do not take place in a  historical or political vacuum 
and there are pre-existing obligations of host countries 
which may preclude the adoption of measures which can 
bring about a win-win situation. 
To summarize, host countries are not only competing to offer 
the best financial terms to potential investors but are not 
adequately considering other related issues of importance 
such as regulations regarding local sourcing of labour and 
other inputs, stakeholder involvement, consistency with food 
security strategies, distribution of food produced between 
export and local markets and distribution of revenues, 
environmental impact (Hallam, 2011).
1.5 Overview of investor & target countries  
The Land Matrix reports that 22 million hectares were 
negotiated between 2000 and 2011 by investors coming 
from 10 countries: USA, Malaysia, UK, China, United Arab 
Emirates, Republic of Korea, India, Australia, South Africa, 
and Canada. For the cases of the USA, UK, Australia and 
Canada the sources of investment are mainly private while 
for China, United Arab Emirates, Republic of Korea the public 
sector is playing the decisive role. In the case of India and 
South Africa the investment sources are mixed. Figure 7 
presents how these 22 million hectares are divided among 
investor countries.
According to the Land Matrix Database (2012), since the 
year 2000 just over 35 million hectares have been subject 
to negotiation in what are considered the top 10 target 
countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Brazil, Philippines, 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique and Argentina. 
Table 3 indicates the number of hectares and land deals 
negotiated under each of these countries as reported by Land 
Matrix portal. The latter gives an idea of the approximate 
size of these ¨mega¨ LSLT´s.
Figures 8 and 9 present investor and target countries 
respectively, as reported in the Land Matrix database 
between 2000 and 2011. The latter suggest that LSLT 
investors are not necessarily all from the north and foreign. 
There are region and domestic agents (or joint ventures 
between domestic and foreign capitals); implying that the so 
called ¨south-south¨ negotiations are also taking place. The 
wide range of countries involved reinforces the idea that the 
widespread global food (and energy) insecurity triggers the 
strategic nature behind this type of deals.
1.6 Dimensions of LSLT´s
As it has been argued, there are new traits which make 
LSLT´s different to previous forms of FDI in the primary 
sector. In this respect, Hall (2011) highlights the following 
aspects:
• Size of investment: There is large variation in the size of 
land deals from tens of thousands of hectares to hundreds 
of thousands (averaging 500 000 hectares) and plans of 
mega-deals deals from 1 up to 10 million hectares
• Duration of investment:  Most deals are defined for long-
term duration (15, 25 or 50 year often renewable as well 
as up to 99-year leases)
• Source of investment:  Foreign and Domestic private in-
vestors (sometimes under the form of joint ventures), 
State Firms, Foreign Sovereign Wealth Funds and related 
investment vehicles, pension or mutual funds.
• Commodity: Cereals (maize, wheat, rice), jatropha, sugar, 
palm oil, other foods, forestry, various minerals
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• But LSLT´s independently of their final use (food, biofuel 
production or other commercial or conservation purpose) 
differ as well in terms of a series of key dimensions (Ta-
ble 4) which have relevant socio-economic and political 
effects in the areas where land deals take place. 
In other words, the type of business model implemented (large 
independent complex vs. integration of local smallholders), 
the way in which land is held (highly dependent on existing 
property rights systems in the host country), definition 
of compensation schemes and labour regimes, plans for 
displacement or construction of infrastructure, constitute 
key varying features of contractual arrangements which 
mark differences among LSLT´s and the impact on the local 
communities. 
In most cases, the above mentioned dimensions are 
determined by the origin of the investor and the institutional 
capacity of the target country to negotiate effectively. 
Therefore, differences at regional level can also be highlighted. 
To illustrate these aspects, a close up is presented for three 
regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, where most deals are reported 
to have taken place in the literature; the Black Sea Region, 
one of the least studied areas but containing one of the 
Table 3: Top target countries
Country Number of Hectares Number of Deals Average Size of Deal
Indonesia 7 527 760 23 327 294
Malaysia 4 819 483 20 240 974
India 4 616 760 109 42 356
Brazil 3 871 824 61 63 473
Philippines 3 191 021 30 106 367
Sudan 3 123 430 17 183 731
Ethiopia 2 412 562 56 43 081
Madagascar 2 176 241 36 60 451
Mozambique 2 017 912 96 21 020
Argentina 1 505 020 22 68 410
Source: Land Matrix (Accessed March 2013)
( I n t e r n a t i o n a l )  L a r g e - S c a l e  L a n d  T r a n s a c t i o n s  ( L S L T ´ s ) :
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Figure 7: Top Investor Countries 2000-2011 & Percentage Allocation of Negotiated Hectares
Note:  Number of hectares negotiated by investors from these 10 countries:  22 063 400
Souce: Land Matrix (Accessed March 2013)
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Table 4: Different Dimensions of LSLT´s
Business model 
Large commercial estates, nucleus estates with out-growers, contract farming for mono-
cultivation
Tenure Arrangements Purchase (rare), lease, concession, enclosures under contested property rights 
Resources Accessed Land, water, minerals, marine resources, wildlife, forestry and labour in certain contexts 
Lease / Compensation 
Payments 
Vary according to value, method of calculation, timing (once-off or repeat, e.g. annual 
payments) and distribution to local communities and their different agents (local authorities, 
land owners, etc.)
Degrees of 
Displacement 
Acquisitions are usually said to take place in ‘vacant’ and ‘unused’ land which may be used for 
grazing, cultivation of local smallholders, or access to forest resources
Labour Regimes
Locally hired labour, imported labour, self-employment under out-grower or contract farming 
schemes 
Settlement Changes in Settlement (e.g. villagisation), De-agrarianisation
Infrastructure Investment in infrastructure for production, processing, and transport 
Source: (Hall, 2011) 
Figure 8: Investor countries of LSLT´s
Source: Land Matrix (Accessed March 2013)
Figure 9: Target countries of LSLT´s
Source: Land Matrix (Accessed March 2013)
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largest tracts of agricultural land worldwide; and Latin 
America, where investors of LSLT´s have mainly a local or 
regional origin.
1.6.1 Nature of LSLT´s in Africa
According to Arezki et al (2012), one of the reasons Africa 
is highly attractive to LSLT investors is its high potential 
to generate output. The authors argue that none of the 
countries of interest to large investors achieve 25% of its 
potential yields, suggesting that enormous gains can be 
made with investments to increase productivity in land 
smallholders already farm, rather than conducting costly 
expansion into un-cultivated lands. The latter is somewhat 
disconnected to the rhetoric on targeting ¨marginal¨ 
lands for LSLT´s (Sparks, 2012; World Bank, 2010) since it 
appears that investors are in fact acquiring large tracts of 
prime agricultural area in Africa (Cotula, 2009; White et al 
2012), although it appears that only 50% of all land deals 
have actually started either an initial development phase or 
actual production (Deininger, 2012).  The case of Democratic 
Republic of Congo or Mozambique are particularly striking 
with LSLT´s representing up to 48% and 21.1% of total 
domestic land (Global Land Project, 2010). 
Arezki et al (2012) also indicate that countries with weak 
land sector governance (as measured in the Institutional 
Profiles Database) are the most attractive to investors – at 
least in terms of the number of LSLT´s. In fact, in most of the 
African deals, the government plays a key role in favouring 
the leasing of what is termed state land but which at local 
level is used for communal purposes (pastoralists, wood, 
herb, fruit collectors, water access, etc.). In these cases, 
users have no official property title to the area in question, a 
situation which raises civil conflicts and demonstrations that 
have been widely documented by Civil Society Organizations 
or Think Tanks such as the Oakland Institute (2011) that has 
well-documented the situation in Sierra Leona. 
In other words, there is wide literature suggesting that 
LSLT´s in Africa take place where land tenure is not strongly 
recognized, where governance is weak and local consent is 
not sought (Vermuelen and Cotula, 2010). This is particularly 
reflected in terms of rates charged per hectare annually 
which vary between 3 and 10 dollars a year and the zero 
or low taxes charged by national documents on the output 
produced.  In exchange, the investors are expected to develop 
infrastructure and provide technological spill over effects to 
any remaining local smallholders. 
One of the top investors in Sub-Saharan Africa identified in 
the literature is China (14) (Doriye, 2010). The Chinese land 
acquisition strategy is based on the government’s objective 
of maximizing the country’s long-term food supply (Grain, 
2008). According to Li Ping from the Chinese Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences China’s increasing need for agricultural 
land and water is so great that there is no other choice than to 
go abroad. Chinese companies leasing land are characterized 
by setting up large farms dedicated to the cultivation of 
rice, soy beans, maize, sugar cane, cassava and/or sorghum 
(for both food and biofuel processing). These companies 
obtain attractive loans from the China Development Bank 
and Exim Bank to facilitate the completion of land deals 
which according to Doriye (2010) include the provision of 
technology, training and infrastructure development funds 
with promised funding of $5 billion dollars for production 
of food and cash crops.  One key aspects of Chinese land 
deals (not only in Africa but also in the Black Sea region) 
is that in many cases, Chinese workforce is also exported 
along with scientists and extension services officials, even 
seeds from Chinese hybrid rice are used. It is estimated that 
1 million Chinese farm labourers worked in Africa during 
2012 (The Economist, 2012). This is highly criticized given 
the abundance of African agricultural labour that could be 
employed but is instead displaced and cannot be effectively 
absorbed in other economic sectors. Other countries which 
have caught the attention of the media because of the 
size of their land deals are the United Arab Emirates and 
South Korea both acquiring 400,000 and 690,000 hectares 
respectively in Sudan.
Another illustrative case in Africa is that of Sierra Leone 
(Saravia-Matus, et al 2012b, c). Early in 2011, close to 500 
000 ha of farmland (10% of arable land in the country) had 
been leased or were under negotiation for lease in Sierra 
Leone (Oakland Institute, 2011). Land regulation in Sierra 
Leone contemplates that any payment for land leasing are 
shared between various national, regional, district and local 
authorities (German et al, 2010).  These land leases (mostly 
fallow lands) are usually tied to compensation in terms of 
fixed rent, and employment in the newly formed large farms. 
A review of the literature on land acquisition processes in 
Sierra Leone reveals three main issues: 
• Compensatory agreements may not be high enough to 
compensate the change in rural livelihoods. According to 
Andrew and Van Vlaenderen (2011) in the land leasing 
agreement of Addax Bioenergy in Sierra Leone (currently 
leasing 10500ha destined to sugar cane plantations for 
ethanol production for export to Europe) the rental pay-
ment is very low – “less than half the estimated average 
annual incomes derived from rice and vegetable crops 
in the wet lowlands and similar to the estimated annual 
value of crops produced on dry rain fed lands cultivated by 
local households(15)”. 
• Individuals not belonging to landowning families who rent 
land on annual basis will be left out from any land leas-
ing/acquisition compensation or payment. This particular 
segment of the rural population is therefore subject to a 
higher degree of vulnerability. Salazar (2004) indicates 
that these non-clan members constitute 20 to 40% of 
chiefdom populations. Although some companies appear 
to be aware of the situation (such as Addax Bioenergy that 
has proposed to lease an extra 1947 ha to produce food 
as part of its Social and Environmental Management Pro-
gram), compensatory actions for landless farmers are not 
explicitly contemplated in official land regulations. 
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• Not enough transparency in land negotiation and agree-
ments.  According to the Oakland Institute (2011), the 
re gulatory framework for the negotiation of land invest-
ments is extremely weak and the impact assessments 
developed by the Sierra Leone Environmental Protection 
Agency (SLEPA) are non-binding and investors have not 
been held accountable to them. One extreme situation 
takes place in the Malem Chiefdom where landowning 
families protest since 2011 against SocFin (leasing 6,475 
ha for oil palm and rubber). Locals claim not to have been 
informed nor participated in any of the negotiations for the 
50 year lease which has been agreed.
LSLT´s in Africa are often not predominantly foreign 
(Deininger 2012). Some examples include Ethiopia, Sudan or 
Mozambique were 94.3%, 68.8% and 67.7% of land deals 
have taken place among domestic parties (or through joint 
ventures between foreign and domestic investors). The latter 
have represented a substantial part of total negotiated 
area (48.9%, 77.8% and 52.5% in the respective three 
countries). Hall (2001) has also highlighted the role intra-
regional investors which may or may not be supported by a 
foreign party. One example is that of South African investors 
and their target countries in Africa. In October 2009 the 
government of DR Congo signed an agreement with AgriSA 
(a consortium of South African Farmers) to allocate an initial 
area of 200,000 hectares of former state farms, with the 
option of expanding to 10 million hectares – an area twice 
the size of Switzerland. DR Congo imports 95% of its food 
requirements, and its Agriculture Minister claimed that the 
deal would stimulate agriculture as part of its New Plan 
of Action (SAPA 2009). Hall (ibid) points out that although 
initially designed as a 99-year lease, it appears that a 
renewable 30-year lease was signed, according to the terms 
of which no rent is payable, and which contains guarantees 
regarding the tariff-free importation of agricultural inputs, 
and unlimited rights to export produce (planned to include 
vegetables and poultry), and for these rights to be heritable. 
On top of this, it is mentioned that customary land rights 
in the area were not respected, while official sources claim 
that the land was vacant and unused and offer the promise 
of employment for the local people (SAPA 2009; Hall 2011). 
According to Sparks (2012) the South African government 
has signed bilateral investment treaties with Angola, 
Cameroon, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. In most cases, South African farmers are said to 
be looking for cheap land, labour water and tax concessions 
for the production of jatropha (for biodiesel), sugarcane (for 
bioethanol) and other crops including maize, soya and palm 
oil. Again, compensation can take the form of resettlement 
on alternative (often poorer quality) land with payments 
going to and staying at central and/or local government level. 
According to IIED (2009) African host countries have poor 
governance and have little capacity to realize substantial 
benefits from LSLT´s at both short and long term.
1.6.2 Nature of LSLT´s in the Black Sea Region
According to Sapelli (2012) 54% of all land deals between 
2007 and 2011 were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Oceania was 
second with 9.5% followed by South America with 9.4%. 
No data is mentioned for the Black Sea Region. This type of 
reports raises critiques which question the lack of attention 
to (and accounting of) land transactions in former Soviet 
Eurasia and an over focus on Africa (Visser and Spoor, 2011). 
In the post-Soviet region, Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan are 
the countries with the largest tracts of farmland which are 
at the same time considered to have (along with Argentina) 
significant untapped capacity to make a major impact on 
meeting the growing global food needs (Davis, 2008 based 
on FAO data). In the words of former Russian Minister of 
Agriculture Gordeev speaking at the ¨Green Week¨ in Berlin 
in 2009 Russia could potentially provide food for 450 million 
people or three times its current population (Visser and 
Bidaseca (2010). 
Why have LSLT´s received less attention in this part of 
the world? One reason is that since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the already large collective and state farms 
(kolkhozes and sovkhozes) of the Communist period were 
mainly transformed into commercial farms which largely 
maintained their size. This occurred despite the distribution 
of land shares among farm workers who for different 
reasons decided not to consolidate medium or small farms. 
Among such reasons were that the registration of allocated 
land implied high bureaucratic costs and in certain regions 
a minimum farm size was also established (for instance, a 
minimum size of 300 hectares was set in Krasnodar Krai, 
Russia). Thus many individuals decided to leave their shares 
of land to be managed under the so called agro-holdings 
or left them uncultivated. With the new land codes allowing 
ownership, transfer and sale of farmland introduced in the 
early 2000´s in Russia and Kazakhstan, the wave of LSLT´s 
was highly facilitated. There was apparently little change 
in the existing agrarian structure since agro-holdings were 
mainly passing from one hand to another. This premise is 
nonetheless challenged when digging deeper in the limited 
literature since a process of increasing number of agro-
holdings as well as higher land concentration is said to have 
occurred as a result of the wave of LSLT´s. 
For instance, according to Yanbykh et al (2013), in Russia 
in 2006 there were 285,000 family farms and individual 
entrepreneurs and the share of the largest 5,000 of them 
accounted for almost half of the total standardized revenue. 
According to the same authors, at the beginning of the 
agrarian reform it was assumed that family farms of a 
‘Western type’ would replace collective and state farms. 
On the contrary, large agricultural enterprises, agro-firms 
and agro-holdings were created and incorporated in their 
structure several or even dozens of former state or collective 
farms (Yanbykh et al, 2013).
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To explore the nature of LSLT´s in the Black Sea Region it 
is necessary to review the definition of agro-holding. An 
agro-holding includes a number of agricultural organizations 
whose controlling blocks of shares are owned by the holding 
company. It acts as an umbrella for the subordinated (not 
only agricultural) units and controls their policies and 
management (Visser et al, 2012). As a rule, both domestic 
and foreign have to invest in Russian land via agro-holdings 
and their number has expanded since 2000. According to the 
Russian Ministry of Agriculture in 2003, more than 90 agro-
holdings were active and by 2006 the number had risen to 
319 private agro-holdings. As a consequence, by the mid 
2000´s in the fertile Black Earth regions (such as Belgorod, 
Lipetsk, Voronezh and Tambvos) there was practically no 
¨free¨ land available that was not yet controlled by an agro-
holding (Visser et al, 2012). There is also high concentration 
of land among the emerging agro-holdings since by mid-
2008 about 11.5 million ha were under the control of 
196 agro-holdings, 32 of them with landholdings of over 
100,000 ha. As rural inhabitants gave up their land shares 
towards the formation of ¨mega-farms¨, the previous use 
of their land for the extraction of by-products (wood, fruit 
or pastoral purpose, etc.) was also terminated (Visser et al, 
2012). However, other sources indicate that the economic/
physical size and number of (very) large farms/holdings 
have been increasing during the last two decades in Russia 
and Ukraine. In a number of cases these (very) large farms/
holdings have been incorporating international stake-holders 
in their ownership structure (Keyzer et al, 2013; Yanbykh et 
al, 2013).
Another different trait of LSLT´s in this part of the world is 
that there are additional incentives for their consolidation. 
The latter is particularly evident in Russia where since the 
early 2000´s the state has stimulated agriculture through 
a range of instruments such as a debt restructuring 
programme, the establishment of a state-financed 
agricultural bank, subsidized crop insurance programmes, 
simplified and lowered taxes on agriculture, and subsidised 
loans for capital investment (Visser et al, 2012; Wegren 
2007). Similarly, in Ukraine, with the Decree on ¨urgent 
measures regarding acceleration of the agricultural sector¨ 
adopted in December 2000, it has effectuated the actual 
privatization of agricultural land, stipulating that land shares 
had to be transformed into private land plots with well-
defined physical boundaries (Keyzer et al, 2013).
Land accumulation strategies of agro-holdings in the Black 
Sea region are varied.  One way to secure land access is 
through negotiation with all shareholders within the agro-
holding in order to have the land shares transferred to the 
investor (such cases include the following companies: Black 
Earth Farming (Sweden)(16), Heartland Farms Ltd (UK) or 
Agro-Invest Brinky BV (The Netherlands). This is a lengthy 
process which can take years and prices for hectares are 
sometimes negotiated separately with each shareholder. 
Another approach is to acquire agro-holding equity. Although 
the process of share emissions only started after the mid-
2000´s, currently Russia and Ukraine have more agro-
holdings at the stock exchange than do the large agricultural 
powers of Latin America (World Bank, 2010). In this sense, 
Russia is now at the forefront of financialisation and 
large-scale global commodification of agriculture and land 
(Visser et al, 2012). Visser et al (2012) report the following 
investments as being of particular relevance in terms of 
size: Us-based PepsiCo obtained a majority share in OJSC 
Wimm-Bill-Dann, the largest dairy agroholding in Russia and 
JP Morgan Chase Bank and MB Capital Partners who are the 
predominant owners of the largest agro-holding in Russia 
Cherkizovo group OJSC.
According to Keyzer et al (2013), speaking in the case of 
Ukraine, the intensification of agricultural production based 
on concentration of land and assets by consolidation into large 
holdings has been made possible by non-transparent control 
over the distribution of the former collective enterprises’ 
property and agricultural lands, and the emergence of an 
informal land market, whereby lease, lease-to-purchase 
and purchase agreements led to consolidation of large 
stretches of farmland in the hands of vertically integrated 
legal entities and natural persons.  The authors highlight that 
hundred thousands of hectares of consolidated land are now 
being cultivated as export-oriented corporations. According 
to the same source, the group of agricultural holdings that 
cultivates more than 10 000 hectares has grown significantly 
since 2004, more than threefold in 2010, on an area that 
was multiplied by four, as the average size of holdings rose 
by 31% to almost 22 000 hectares.
Investors from Asia are present in the Black Sea Region, 
but their LSLT´s are said to be more recent as a result of 
the price spike of 2007-8 (Visser and Spoor, 2010). Unlike 
Western investors, Asian or Middle Eastern governments 
(mainly in the cases of China, South Korea and the Gulf 
States) directly support LSLT´s and these take place in 
areas that are geographically closer to national borders (i.e. 
Siberia, and eastern borders of the Former Soviet Union). A 
major difference is that while Western investors mostly only 
ship in Western technology, Asian investors have a tendency 
to also bring their own workforce (Cotula, 2009) and/or work 
with ethnic minorities that are culturally closer to them. One 
of the largest deals planned in the region is that of China 
for one million hectares of farmland in Ukraine to cultivate 
rapeseed and soy.  The size of deals creates social tension 
among local communities as well as a fear that these 
investors from the Far East are trying to get control over 
sparsely populated lands. Lastly, there is investment among 
Former Soviet Union states which are also substantial but 
generate less media attention. The main example is that of 
the Ivolga-holding controlling 1 million hectares of land in 
both Kazakhstan and Russia (Visser and Spoor, 2010).  
1.6.3 Nature of LSLT´s in Latin America
In Latin America the definition of LSLT´s has been varied. 
According to the regional office of the FAO (2011), the 
phenomenon has mainly taken place in two (land-abundant) 
countries: Brazil or Argentina. For academics associated 
( I n t e r n a t i o n a l )  L a r g e - S c a l e  L a n d  T r a n s a c t i o n s  ( L S L T ´ s ) :
A  n e w  p h e n o m e n o n
A n  O v e r v i e w  o f  ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l )  L a r g e - S c a l e  L a n d  T r a n s a c t i o n s  ( L S L T )  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  F o o d  S e c u r i t y
26
to ¨Via Campesina¨, the acquisition or grabbing of land is 
actively taking place in other countries of the region (Table 
5).  (For a review on Agricultural FDI in the region refer to 
the forthcoming 2012 FDI flagship publication of UN-ECLAC)
The differences between the 2011 FAO study and Borras 
et al article are largely connected to how land deals are 
defined. According to the former, the phenomenon is 
connected to the presence of a foreign government in the 
investor side (either as direct investor or as supporter of a 
foreign firm) and it is assessed in terms of its effect on food 
security at national level of the host country. For Borras et 
al (2012) ¨land grabbing¨ in the region is taking place not 
only through the investment of foreign public sectors but 
mainly through the intervention of international, regional 
and domestic actors. In this respect the authors highlight 
the role of ¨translatinas¨ firms (or firms which have a Latin 
American origin and also invest within their region) and of 
domestic firms or individuals within the host country. The 
latter may or may not be necessarily associated to a foreign 
investing partner. Moreover, Borras et al (2012) point out 
that LSLT´s are serving not only food and biofuel processing 
objectives but also uses related to forestry, conservation as 
well as the production of other cash crops. 
Borras et al (2012) particularly highlight the case of the so-
called ¨brasiguayos¨. That is, they include as land grabbing 
the acquisition of large tracts of land in Paraguay by private 
Brazilian farmers. These acquisitions, on the other hand, are 
under the 1,000 ha minimum set by the Land Matrix in order 
for the deal to be included in their database. While the Land 
Matrix has registered that about 6.5 million ha negotiated in 
Latin America between 2000 and 2012, Borras et al (2012) 
have documented that in Paraguay alone about 1.8 million 
hectares have been subject to ¨land grabbing¨ between 
2006 and 2010. Consequently, depending on the definition 
used for LSLT´s, the extent of the phenomenon can be very 
different. 
In Latin America a variety of foreign investors may also be 
found. On one hand, there are the investors interested in the 
provision of basic staple crops for their domestic economies. 
One case is that of Al-Khorayef conglomerate (Saudi Arabia) 
that reached an agreement with the Provincial Government 
of El Chaco in Argentina to produce sorghum in 200 000 ha 
(with an estimated investment of US$ 400 million dollars). 
Another case is that of Walbrok group (Indo-Malayan 
capital) which acquired 600 000 ha to produce staple 
crops under a contractual arrangement with Argentinean 
farmers (Observatorio Iberoamericano de Asia Pacífico, 
2011).  Transnational companies from the agro-chemical 
sector, such as Monsanto, Dow and Dupont have also 
announced their plans to acquire 2 million ha in Mexico for 
the planting of hybrid maize. This is still under consideration 
by the Mexican authorities since potential threats to local 
varieties are being evaluated. There are also a series of 
biofuel companies all over the region, a few examples are: 
Pure Biofuels (USA) with 74 thousand ha in Peru or Shree 
Renuka Sugars, that acquired in 2010 130 000 ha in Brazil. 
Lastly, another interesting fact is that private investors from 
Brazil have also started acquiring land in countries such as 
Ethiopia and Mozambique (about 28 000 ha). According to 
Land Matrix data the deals are aimed at growing sugarcane 
and other crops.
Table 5: Land grabbing by country, by sector (According to Borras et al, 2012)
Country Flex crops and other food sectors Non-Food
Argentina Soya, wheat, livestock, sugarcane, fruit Tobacco, conservation
Bolivia Soya, livestock Forestry
Brazil Soya, sugarcane, poultry, livestock, fruit Forestry
Chile Fruit, dairy, wine, seeds, poultry Conservation, Forestry
Colombia Oil palm, sugar beets, sugarcane, soya, rice, corn Forestry
Ecuador Banana, sugarcane, oil palm Forestry, minerals
Paraguay Soya, corn, wheat, livestock
Peru Fruits, vegetables, sugarcane, oil palm Minerals
Uruguay Soya, dairy, what, rice, livestock Forestry
Mexico Corn value chain, sugarcane, fruits, coffee Flowers, tequila, conservation
Costa Rica Banana, pineapple, oil palm
Guatemala Sugarcane, oil palm Forestry
Nicaragua Livestock,  rice, oil palm, sugarcane, citrus Tourism, forestry
Panama Banana, coffee, rice, oil palm
Dominican Republic Sugarcane, banana, fruits, vegetables
Guyana Sugarcane, livestock, rice, pineapple Forestry
Trinidad & Tobago Sugarcane, cacao, fruits
Source: Borras et al (2012) quoting Gómez (2011)
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A s s e s s m e n t  o f  L S L T ´ s  i n  t e r m s  o f  E f f i c i e n c y  / P r o d u c t i v i t y , 
T r a n s p a r e n c y  a n d  C o m p e n s a t i o n
The analysis of LSLT´s is directly related to the identification 
of the agricultural production structures which make the 
most efficient use of existing resources and thus contributes 
to overall development (Arezki, 2012).  From this perspective, 
three aspects of LSLT´s are separately evaluated in this 
section: 
 
• First, the question of efficient use of inputs (from an eco-
nomic and environmental viewpoint) and overall farm pro-
ductivity are addressed by revisiting the inverse produc-
tivity-size hypothesis. The discussion is complemented by 
reviewing the role of direct farming in low as well as high 
income countries. 
• Second, the question of transparency of LSLT´s is dis-
cussed in order to analyse how (weak) institutions and 
governance relate to achieving widespread development 
goals. 
• Third, the compensation frameworks of LSLT´s (based on 
qualitative cases) are assessed.  
2.1 A question of Efficiency/Productivity
At the centre of the consolidation and expansion of new 
large-scale farming systems is the discussion of size 
and productivity in agriculture. This has direct and long-
term implications for the future of farming (and the rural 
populations) (Scoones, 2010a). In this sub-section, the 
theoretical and empirical literature supporting one structural 
farm type against another, including not only efficiency/
productivity aspects but also environmental issues is 
revisited. The discussion will be accompanied by an overview 
of the relevant policy discourse. 
2.1.1 On of the Relationship between Farm Size and Out-
put per Land Unit: Theoretical and Empirical Issues
In 1954 Lewis (Nobel laureate in 1979) proposed his dual 
sector development model. It was based on the assumption 
that many developing countries had dual economies with 
both a traditional agricultural sector and a modern industrial 
sector. The dual economy model became a predominant 
analytical paradigm which strongly influenced policy making 
since the post-World War II decades. In this framework, 
agriculture has been considered the less efficient, less 
productive economic sector. Griffin (1969) explains that 
in the conception of the dualistic models “the traditional, 
feudal, agricultural sector is stagnant; production is for 
subsistence; little output passes through a market; the 
leisure preferences of producers are high and they do not 
follow maximizing behaviour. Unemployment is assumed to 
be widespread… and, indeed, the marginal product of labour 
is zero if not negative”; its counterpart, the industrial sector in 
the urban environment, possesses all the desirable opposite 
characteristics that include technological advancement, 
higher levels of investment and savings, etc. This theoretical 
background has strengthened and deepened the bias in 
favour of the urban/industrial sector in most development 
strategies (Saravia-Matus, 2009). This discussion has 
fed the idea that the agricultural sector must become 
industrialized and organized into larger units in order to 
gain efficiency, to enjoy economies of scales, to benefit from 
labour arrangements with wage workers, access equipment 
and machinery, adopt new technology etc.  
Lewis model was not the first. From the perspective of 
classical political economy, the Physiocrats were among the 
very first to support large-scale forms of farm organization 
in agriculture.  According to François Quesnay (1986[1758]) 
who developed the “Tableau Economique des Phisiocrates” 
or the economic model of this group, there were three 
economic movers:  the land owners, the agricultural workers 
and the “sterile” consisting of merchants and artisans (Villey 
and Neme, 1996). Under this model, the advantages of 
larger farms in terms of cost structures are emphasised. 
However, some years later Adam Smith (1776) indicated 
the role and value of smaller farming units by focusing on 
the case of yeomanry in England. The Yeoman is the term 
given to a free man who was devoted to his own farm 
from the Elizabethan era onwards. These farmers are 
given the main credit for conducting with great success the 
British Agricultural or Agrarian Revolution which consisted 
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in an evolving process of improving soil preservation and 
input mixes to increase yields per land unit (Allen, 1989). 
According to Allen (1989) yeomanry is at the heart of the 
productivity growth recorded in England during the 17th 
century which later contributed to the emergence of the 
Industrial Revolution.
While emphasising on the role of small farms Smith (1776) 
also introduced the concept of economies of scale which is 
the basis for the focus that most of economics later gave 
to large scale production units. For instance, in the case 
of the neo-classics or marginalist economics framework 
this occurred via the development of a classification of 
economies of scales (A.E.G. Robinson, 1931), as well as the 
idea that largest installations are better utilized than smaller 
ones (N. Georgescu-Roegen, 1972, 1976).  
It is interesting to recall here that within the wide range 
of believers that ‘large is beautiful’ is also another major 
character in economic thought, indeed quite far from 
mainstream economics, such as Karl Marx. According to 
Marx the agricultural system of direct farming (that is most 
often inherently ‘small’) represented an inadequate form of 
organization. He was convinced that these small-scale farms 
were the result of the dissolution of the feudal system and in 
his view the difficulties they had to face to adapt and adopt 
new technology would eventually lead to their disappearance 
(Marx, Das Kapital, Book 1, 1976[1867]; Villey and Neme, 
1996). Not few among socialists’ thinkers were convinced 
of the same, as recalls the following quote by Lenin, which 
support the same principle: “small-scale production gives 
birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, 
hourly, with elemental force, and in vast proportions” (cited 
by Byrne, 2008). In accordance with Marx’s and Lenin’s 
viewpoints, Trozski envisaged the organization of the 
agricultural setting as that of an enormous factory (sovkhoz 
or state farms and kolkhoz or collective farms). Yet, Bukharin 
held an opposite view and addressed the particularities 
of peasant (or direct firming) agricultural production. As 
history reveals the Trozskian view prevailed (particularly 
during the Stalinist period) but it is worthwhile examining 
the theoretical postulates of the competing proposal which 
were based on the work of Alexander Chayanov. According to 
Chayanov (1920) there were key disadvantages in the soviet 
agricultural planning (based on large state and collective 
farms) because they disregarded the motivations and 
incentives governing peasant agriculture for which (in the 
absence of markets) the accumulation of surplus was not 
an immediate objective. In his view, peasants who practice 
subsistence farming will concentrate their efforts in the 
production of the food required to meet their survival needs 
(Chayanov, 1920). 
In 1962 Sen addressed the issue of an inverse relationship 
between the size of the farm and the output per hectare 
for the particular case of the Indian Agriculture. Other 
studies followed as identified by Larson et al (2012) such 
as Yotopoulos and Lau (1973) who argued that Indian 
smallholders were more efficient because owner-managers 
had an advantage in supervision and leadership; Taslim 
(1989) made similar arguments using Bangladesh data. Also 
based on Indian agriculture Ghatak (1987, p. 355) explored 
the motivations of small-scale farmers and presented a list 
of reasons why there is an inverse relationship between 
farm size and output per acre based on empirical studies:
• Small farmers tend to use inputs such as labour more in-
tensively and efficiently because they operate to achieve 
a level of survival. Unlike larger farm structures, peasants 
in small plots maximize total income not profit. Family 
labour is employed until its marginal productivity equals 
zero in the peasant small farm, while “capitalistic” farming 
employs labour until the level where marginal productivity 
equals the wage. 
• In large-scale farms workers, tenants or share croppers 
are commonly used for production. Such arrangements 
are usually not instituted in a legal framework or if they 
are they tend to provide a smaller compensation in com-
parison to owner-operated tenure. The latter unchains dis-
incentives that are not present in owner-operated plots; 
these include the risk of eviction for the tiller or shirking 
of paid workers.
• Poor farmers in distress sell land of inferior quality to the 
landowners of larger plots while keeping the more fertile 
smaller plot (assuming a well-functioning land market and 
property right system).
All of the above mentioned arguments support the inverse 
productivity-size relationship hypothesis depicted in Figure 10.
In other words, the key determinant that makes smaller farms 
more efficient than larger ones is their higher degree of land 
utilization. Yet, both under the Marxian thought and the early 
classical economists (with the exception of Smith), there was 
Figure 10:  Inverse Productivity-Size Relationship 
Hypothesis
Source: Own elaboration adapted from Barret et al (2010)
Yield
Cultivated Area in Agricultural Unit (Ha´s)
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the issue of economies of scale which could be best enjoyed 
in the context of a large-scale farm. However, empirical 
findings on this subject are not conclusive. According to 
Otsuka et al (1992, p. 1974), the scope of scale economies is 
rather limited in agricultural production; making small farm 
more socially efficient given its labour intensive nature. The 
literature also indicates that the monitoring and supervision 
of hired labour in large production systems that involve 
mixed crop rotation and raising livestock can be substantial; 
making the family farm the optimal structure (Ghatak, 1987, 
Otsuka, 1992; Gomez y Paloma and Segrè, 1993, Saravia-
Matus, 2009).  From an empirical perspective, Larson et al 
(2012) found evidence that supports the hypothesis that 
maize yields fall with increases in the scale of production 
based on four datasets containing detailed production data 
at the plot level (LSMS in Malawi and Tanzania and REPEAT 
project database in Kenya and Uganda).  
As stated by Arezki et al (2012) owner-operators usually 
are more motivated to adjust to micro-variations in climate 
and seasonality because they better internalize the benefits 
resulting from their operations. More importantly, family-
owned farms (i.e. direct farming) rather than large companies 
run by hired labour, have been the most competitive all 
over the word, including in developed countries such as the 
United States and Europe, contributing to poverty reduction 
in a wide range of settings (Lipton, 2009). While in the 
context of high transaction costs related to output markets 
that encourage self-sufficiency, also small farms appear as 
having efficient strategies because food security concerns 
induce smallholder farmers to supply added labour as a risk-
mitigation strategy (Lipton, 2006; Kami, 2006)
 
But in the recent wave of farmland acquisitions, there is 
a propensity towards mono-cultivation and mechanization 
which is largely inspired by the apparent export 
competitiveness of mega farms in Eastern Europe or 
Latin America which highly benefited during the 2007-8 
price spikes. According to Rosset (1999) yield (understood 
as the production per unit area of a single crop i.e. metric 
tons of crop per hectare) can be higher in a large-scale 
farm. However small-scale farming is not characterized by 
mono-cultivation but rather by mixed or integrated farming 
systems and so the concept of total output is proposed to 
establish comparisons.  Total output or the sum of everything 
a small farmer produces (various grains, fruits, vegetable, 
fodder, animal products etc.) is higher per unit area in small-
scale farms than in monocultures. The reason behind this 
is that with intercropping practices, empty niche spaces are 
occupied by other crops and the rotation of crops along with 
the presence of livestock contributes to replenishing soil 
fertility. To summarize, multiple cropping, output composition, 
land and input use intensity, labour quality and intensity are 
among the factors which contribute to higher productivity of 
small farms (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006). 
However, Deininger and Byerlee (2011) reflect on the factors 
which have contributed to increased farm size among which 
the following are listed: 
i) new technology that makes it easier to supervise labour 
or occupy it continuously 
ii) limited availability of labour in frontier areas, possibly 
exacerbated by high capital requirements of land clear-
ance and infrastructure construction and 
iii) greater emphasis on integrated supply chains and certifi-
cation of produce. 
One example of technology improvements in large-scale 
farming relates to tillage which is guided by GPS information 
systems. Private operators in Argentina and Ukraine assert 
that, with modern technology, good managers can effectively 
supervise units of 10 000 to 15 000 ha for grain and oilseeds. 
The latter makes labour supervision easier and reduces 
associated costs.  This type of examples partially addresses 
the argument which relate to the higher transaction costs of 
supervising hired labour in large farms in comparison to the 
more motivated family labour on peasant farms.  In addition, 
it is stated that in large farms it is also possible to reduce 
transaction costs associated to the acquisition of certain 
inputs such as credit while bargaining power in the purchase 
of fertilizers or equipment is increased. Nonetheless, the 
establishment of farmer cooperatives could be encouraged 
to ensure that smaller farms can also save on transaction 
costs of accessing certain inputs and move up the value 
chain into processing, packaging and marketing of their 
crops.
Like Otsuka (1992) Deininger and Byerlee (2011) also 
recognize that while large farms have historically had a 
dominant role in plantation crops, agricultural production is not 
characterized by significant economies of scale. In addition, 
the authors also coincide that any advantages in terms of 
marketing or processing of agricultural output of larger 
farms can be overcome by smaller farms through collective 
actions, although the latter requires strong organizational 
efforts and institutional coordination from various agents. As 
an example, Deininger and Byerlee (2011) refer to studies 
in Russia which fail to find any inherent economies of size 
in farm production but they clearly stress advantages of 
large farms in terms of lower transaction costs and higher 
product prices. The latter implies that the ability to overcome 
market imperfections is a key driver for consolidating large 
farms in Russia. Similarly, the experiences in Russia reflect 
that large farms, even if they are not vertically integrated, 
can also leverage their superior bargaining power as 
markets for agricultural inputs and outputs are often highly 
concentrated. Visser and Spoor (2011) present however, 
different conclusions in the case of Post-Soviet Eurasia 
large-scale farming. In their article it is indicated that the 
performance of large farms enterprises (taken over by agro 
holdings) is not better than that of farm enterprises that 
are not incorporated into them. A study on the effectiveness 
of farm enterprises within and outside agro holdings in the 
Belgorod region found that the performance within agro-
holdings was lagging behind those outside such structures. 
This suggests (as illustrated in section 1.6.2 above) that there 
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are also more fundamental obstacles intrinsically connected 
to the organizational functioning of agro holdings that hinder 
a steady increase in productivity and efficiency. This is also 
supported by profit figures collected (Yanbykh et al. (2013). 
The authors indicate that the most effective agricultural 
holdings were those aligned with foreign parent companies: 
their profitability was 25.9 per cent on average, while the 
profitability of independent large and medium agricultural 
enterprises was only 12.5 per cent. The least efficient farms 
were state agricultural holdings (average profitability of 4 per 
cent). Municipal agro-holdings were unprofitable (-12.5 per 
cent).
Another aspect which Deininger and Byerlee (2011) highlight 
is that large companies can expand strategically by acquiring 
assets at relatively low prices in periods of climatic or other 
distress. This type of land acquisition may be associated 
to distress sales and so Deininger and Byerlee (2011) 
emphasize that the recent emergence of large-scale farms 
may be associated to significant social and environmental 
risks mainly in the presence of badly defined property rights, 
lack of a transparent and enforceable regulatory frameworks, 
distorted input prices and inadequate provision of public 
goods. 
Consequently, Deininger and Byerlee (2011) conclude that 
it is in cases of land abundant countries (where specific 
conditions apply) that we may find potential for large-scale 
farming. These conditions refer to: 
i) growth of non-agricultural employment and the sector’s 
ability to absorb labour 
ii) availability of uncultivated land that is potentially suitable 
for agricultural production in areas with very low popula-
tion density and 
iii) the extent to which gaps in provision of public goods or 
market imperfections may limit the scope for the agricul-
tural sector to achieve its potential as indicated by the 
“yield gap” which indicate whether gaps in technology, 
institutions or other public goods (infrastructure) prevent 
existing cultivators from realizing their potential. 
In the case where labour is abundant other conclusions may 
be drawn. There is evidence on the potential benefits of small 
farms in promoting rural development and social efficiency 
(Berry & Cline, 1979; Ghatak, 1987). In this sense, Berry and 
Cline (1992) favour land reforms which support the expansion 
of small farms since it constitutes an effective mechanism to 
increase employment and output in the agricultural sector, as 
long as the country has a surplus of labour at low opportunity 
cost. It is until the opportunity cost of labour becomes relatively 
high that the advantages of small farms tend to disappear. 
In the meantime, as Doner (1992, p. 70) argues: “People 
cannot simply be placed on hold until they are needed by the 
industry”, stressing major importance on the potential social 
benefits of a land reform. Arthur Young (1741-1820) claimed 
that “the magic of property turns sand into gold” (quotation), 
but evidence has proved that an egalitarian land reform 
program alone is not sufficient to guarantee agricultural 
development, particularly for smallholders (Todaro & Smith, 
2003, p. 453). Failed agrarian reform processes are largely 
found in Latin America (i.e. Nicaragua) where land gini 
coefficients remain largely unaltered. Property formalisation 
should thus be considered a technical tool because it is not 
enough on its own to reduce poverty (De Soto, 2000). Other 
measures which include extension services, market access, 
support to farmer organizations and training are essential to 
stimulate (semi)subsistence farming (Saravia-Matus et al, 
2012a). 
For Hall (2011) as well as other defendants of the Via 
Campesina such as Saturnino (2012) or Scoones (2010a), 
the World Bank latest publication on “Rising Global Interest 
in Farmland” is diverging from its previous position of an 
“inverse-size productivity relationship” favouring small 
farms and highlighting their role in poverty reduction. This 
pro-smallholder position was mainly represented through 
studies by Deininger and Binswanger, 1992; Binswanger et al, 
1995; Stiglitz, 1998, Allen and Lueck 1998, Binswanger and 
Deininger 1997, among others where it was demonstrated 
that agricultural production has few technical (dis)economies 
of scale so that a range of production forms could coexist. 
It was thus often framed that smallholder organization was 
crucial to improve rural livelihoods since agriculture was seen 
as the main economic engine to foster (rural) development 
(Larson et al, 2012). This critique by Hall (2011) and others 
however is somewhat counter-argued by declarations of 
World Bank President Robert Zoellick in 2011 who expressed 
support for smallholder-led strategies (17) .  
2.2.2 Environmental Aspects of Large-Scale Farming & 
Long Term Productivity
According to Scoones (2010a) there are research findings 
which illustrate that industrial (capital and energy intensive) 
forms of agriculture are unsustainable and accelerate global 
warming rather than slowing it down (Scoones, 2010b). In this 
respect, the UNEP GEAS (2011) reports a series of potential 
environmental impacts of the rush for land, particularly 
when aimed at monoculture. Monoculture has been widely 
accepted as the most efficient type of large-scale agriculture. 
But their long term productivity is challenged. According to 
Rosset (2011) high yields may result, at least for a time (18), 
but growing one crop over a large area for several years has 
negative environmental impacts that will deteriorate overall 
performance. 
One of these impacts relates to biodiversity loss. Studies in 
Malaysia and Indonesia have shown that 80-100 per cent 
of fauna species in tropical rainforests cannot survive in oil-
palm monocultures due to increased pressures from various 
crop diseases and pests (Fitzherbert et al 2008), often 
requiring large scale use of chemical pesticides, fungicides 
and herbicides (UNEP, GEAS 2011). In addition, increased 
fertilizer use to safeguard crop yield may increase pollutant 
levels in downstream waters and nitrous oxide emissions 
(SCAR 2011). 
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Over the last decade, approximately 14 million hectares 
of forest per year has been converted to other uses or lost 
through natural causes, particularly in Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (FAO 2010) where many large-scale 
agricultural projects are or will be be located. 
In the UNEP GEAS report (2011) it is stated that much of the 
land area under biofuel crops will come at the expense of 
forests and pasture (Melilo and others 2009, Fairley 2011). 
For example, the expansion of soya beans and sugarcane for 
the production of agro-fuels in Brazil has destroyed protected 
areas of the Amazon and Cerrado (Mendonça 2011). The 
Cerrado (savannah) holds nearly 160 000 species of plants 
and animals, many of which are endangered. Studies indicate 
that nearly 22 000km2 of savannah are cleared each year for 
sugarcane production (Mendonça 2011). With technological 
advances, use of biofuels in transport is expected to increase 
from the current 2 per cent to 27 per cent by the year 2050 
(Fairley 2011). At least 55-59 per cent of oil palm expansion 
in Malaysia and 56 per cent in Indonesia has been at the 
expense of forests (Koh and Wilcove 2008). Deforestation 
is one of the major environmental threats facing Ethiopia. 
Much of the land that has been given to investors (and that 
is marketed as available) is not presently under cultivation, 
rather much of it is covered by woodland or forest (OI 2011a).
In addition, depending on the methods used to process 
biofuel or produce the feedstock, some crops can even 
generate more greenhouse gases than do fossil fuels. For 
example, nitrous oxide, a greenhouse gas with a global 
warming potential around 300 times greater than that of 
carbon dioxide, is released from nitrogen fertilizers (FAO 
2008). 
The impacts of climate change represent a challenge for the 
future of agriculture. According to Padgham (2009) if no 
adaptation measures are put in place a temperature increase 
as small as 1 degree Celsius by 2030 will lead to a decline 
in yields of major cereal crops in the tropics and subtropics. 
Impacts of temperature increase of 3 degree Celsius or more 
by 2100 could result in a significant loss of productivity in 
low-altitude regions and diminish effectiveness of adaptation 
measures (Padgham, 2009 cited by UNEP GEAS (2011)).
Another important factor of environmental risk associated 
to large-scale farming is the increased competition for 
water (Rost et al, 2009). The Oakland Institute (2011a) has 
recently reported that In Ethiopia, for example, several key 
wetland areas have been given to investors and evidence of 
limits on water use are lacking. Further, of the lands listed 
as available for large-scale commercial agriculture, more 
than 70 per cent, or 1.5 million hectares, are located within 
the Nile watershed. Ethiopia constitutes about 90 per cent 
of the total flow of the Nile and impacts of water use on 
downstream users in the future may raise concerns (UNEP 
GEAS, 2011). Similarly, the intention of the government of 
Mali is to extend the irrigated area from the current 100,000 
ha to 960,000 ha through large land leases. This will involve 
a massive increase in the amount of water extracted from 
the Niger River, which is shared by nine countries within its 
watershed—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria (OI 2011b).
According to IAAST (2009) the dominant practice of 
industrial, large-scale agriculture is unsustainable, mainly 
because of the dependence on such farming on cheap 
energy, its negative effects on ecosystems and growing 
water scarcity. Instead, industrial monocultures must be 
reconsidered in favour of agro-ecosystems that combine 
mixed crop production with conserving water supply 
preserving biodiversity and improving the livelihoods of the 
poor in small scale mixed farming (Scoones, 2010a).  For 
this purpose it is not necessary to invest in farmland but in 
public services, rural infrastructure and innovation programs 
for smallholders.
2.2 A question of Transparency
Under this sub-section, we proceed to describe how LSLT´s 
take place in theory and in practice. Similarly, we explore the 
main forms of local response (in terms of either resisting or 
welcoming new investors) and the recent response of the 
international community on how to promote responsible 
investment in land.
In the context of a global economy with open markets 
and multiple agents, neoclassical theory indicates that the 
best allocation of resources may be achieved. However, in 
reality there is no equal bargaining power between sellers 
and buyers particularly in the case of farmland acquisition 
or leasing in low income countries. Although land deals 
presume a willing buyer and a willing seller, they often involve 
contracts negotiated behind closed doors and between 
powerful groups that rarely include the people who use the 
land in question on a daily basis. The latter raises particular 
concerns in terms of how the weakest social groups stand 
concerning LSLT´s; particularly how rural smallholders 
(especially women) will fare in the competition to control 
resources. The latter is a worrying situation mainly for rural 
women in low income countries who constitute the most 
resource poor and neglected socio-economic group. Women 
are said to produce 80% of household food needs, but on 
average control less than 2 per cent of the land (ActionAid, 
2012).
As reported by Scoones (2010a) land deals are usually 
portrayed as consisting of  “unused”, “unproductive”, “idle” 
or even “empty”.  In fact the World Bank (2010) refers to 
a “vast under-utilised reserve” (as cited by Hall 2011). A 
first difficulty is that concepts such as “under-utilized” or 
“available land” tend to obscure the fact that these are not 
really unoccupied lands but lands used in ways that are not 
perceived  as productive by governments (Cotula et al, 2009). 
Mounting evidence shows that leases or concessions have 
been granted on communal land that is already claimed, 
occupied and used by local people (Hall 2011, Cotula et al. 
2009, Sulle and Nelson 2009).  In the case of Africa (where 
most deals have taken place), this is an important aspect to 
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consider given that there are 80 million smallholder farms 
(which contribute 30% to continent’s gross domestic product 
and 40% of its exports) and whose activities sustain many 
of Africa´s poorest citizens. Yet the secretive nature of 
such deals as well as of the identities of the investors and 
the terms of the deals (including the distribution of rents 
from them), is  maintained, partly because of the contested 
authority of states to allocate lands to which citizens might 
have a prior competing claim (Alden Wily 2010 cited by Hall 
2011). 
Scoones (2010a) refers to the one precise example presented 
by NGO RAINS on how a Norwegian agro fuel company Agro 
Fuel Africa (a subsidiary of Bio Fuel Norway) took advantage 
of Northern Ghana’s traditional system of communal land 
ownership in an attempt to claim on on large tracts of forest 
area and create the “largest jatropha plantation in the world”. 
It is stated that “the company co-opted local government 
officials and together with them persuaded an illiterate local 
chief to sign away 38 000 ha and several whole villages with 
a single thumb print”. 
These events are not only reported in Africa. Visser and Spoor 
(2011) state that in post-Soviet Eurasia few landowners 
understand and exercise their legal rights within agro-
holdings. The authors refer to a village in the Pskov region 
where several villagers filed a court case in order to regain the 
land they were entitled to from a large farming enterprise. 
The authors conclude that large-scale land acquisitions in 
this part of the world (whether conducted legally or under 
the counter) might well have far-reaching consequences for 
the livelihoods of the rural population, which already has few 
rights and low incomes.
The response of the international policy agents can be 
summarized under the newly published “Voluntary Guidelines 
on the responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of Food Security” published on 9 
March, 2012 by FAO and 96 signing governments (UN NEWS 
Centre, 13 March 2012). In this document, the main objective 
is to put forward recommendations which safeguard the 
people’s tenure rights from risks that could arise from large-
scale land acquisitions.  According to FAO Chief Graziano 
Da Silva the goal is to give poor and vulnerable people 
secure and equitable rights to access land and other natural 
resources as a key condition in the fight against hunger 
and poverty. However, these guidelines are defined at a 
moral level, because the rules adopted are voluntary and 
not compulsory. In fact, only moral sanctions are foreseen 
(Sapelli, 2012).
Other relevant regulations concern The Santiago Principles 
which contain 24 voluntary guidelines that assign “best 
practices” for the operations of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 
The principles were proposed in 2008 through a joint effort 
between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
“International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds” 
(IWG-SWF). 25 nations have signed onto the principles. In the 
same spirit, the UN Global Compact may also be highlighted. 
The latter is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that 
are committed to aligning their operations and strategies 
with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of 
human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. ¨By 
doing so, business, as a primary driver of globalization, can 
help ensure that markets, commerce, technology and finance 
advance in ways that benefit economies and societies 
everywhere¨ (http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/
index.html)
2.3 A question of Compensation
In this section, we attempt to analyse who are the main 
winners and losers from the new wave of farmland 
acquisitions worldwide. In addition, we bring forward any 
available evidence on the type of compensation schemes for 
different land deals. 
Governments supporting the acquisition of great expanses 
of land by large corporations, foreign and domestic, usually 
in the form of long-term concessions or leases rather 
than outright purchase, do so in the name of development 
(Scoones, 2010a). A review of experiences with local 
smallholders suggests that contract farming (as opposed 
to pooling programs) which allows smallholders to retain 
property rights over their land is advocated as an alternative 
to outright purchases and leasing of land (Hallam, in 
Kugelman and Levenstein, 2009). In this respect, contract 
farming if properly managed can allow farmers to be 
supported by indispensable investments without depriving 
them of access to their land, particularly where the buyer 
negotiates with farmers cooperatives (De Schutter, 2011). It 
is also considered that contract farming would be a better 
exit concerning food security objectives since it would allow 
growing as well their own crops (Kugelman and Leveinstein, 
2009). 
But contract farming schemes (which could allow smallholders 
to maintain a diversified livelihood strategy) are not frequent. 
Cochet and Merlet (2011) have undertaken a study which 
calculates which stakeholders rip the benefits from the 
value added generated in large-scale field production. They 
present an analysis of net aggregated value of agricultural 
output in terms of the percentage share of return on labour 
(salaries), capital, land rent, taxes for case studies in Ukraine 
and Ecuador. Their findings indicate that under large-scale 
farms, there is a growing gap between return on capital 
and remuneration for labour, with the previous increasing at 
detriment of the latter. Labour compensation is limited while 
Capitalist investors manage to secure very cheap access to 
land. Consequently, value added is highly concentrated on 
the return on capital, disregarding both fair compensation 
for labour and the land use. This situation is particularly 
acute in the case of large-scale farms which are non-labour 
intensive.
Government and policy reports (such as World Bank 2010 
or NSADP 2009) indicate that in principle positive effects 
emerging from LSLT´s could include: additional income 
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possibilities and employment opportunities, reactivation 
of abandoned land, integration of smallholder/family 
farmers to markets, training of farmers, etc. The negative 
effects commonly listed by Think Tanks and NGO´s (such 
as the Oakland Institute 2011 or ActionAid 2012) refer to 
displacement, stronger competition for remaining land, 
reduction of land access for smallholders, emigration of 
local farmers which can increase social tensions and urban 
poverty, immigration of foreign employers that can invoke 
social friction in rural areas. Besides these socio-economic 
implications, negative environmental impact may include soil 
erosion, abuse of natural resources, reduction of biodiversity, 
introduction of plants or species that are not part of the local 
biodiversity (such as eucalyptus, palm trees or rubber in 
some areas), etc. (GTZ, 2009).
The World Bank (2010) states that large-scale land 
acquisition can be a vehicle for poverty reduction through 
three main mechanisms: the generation of employment 
for wage workers, new opportunities for local farmers and 
payments for the lease or purchase of land.  Each of these 
aspects is separately addressed.
• Generation of Employment
Job creation capacity on the mono-cultivation of various 
crops selected (for the expansion of large-scale farms) is 
not necessarily abundant. For example, the number of 
projected jobs is very small for grains with 10 workers per 
1000 hectares, soy with 18 per 1000 hectares, forestry 
plantation with 20 per 1000 hectares, sugar cane with 150 
per 1000 hectares and oil palm with 3 per 1000 hectares; 
(only rubber reports higher labour requirements of 400 
per 1000 hectares). Another issue which may reduce the 
effect of employment generation is that migrant work is 
sometimes hired over local people (Scoones, 2010a). Lastly, 
job conditions appear to be precarious with scant protection 
against health hazards, irregular wage payments and no 
legal regulations (LRAN, 2011).
• Opportunities for Local Farmers
The literature suggests that there are differences in terms 
of potential benefits for farmers who pool their land to 
be managed as a single block by the foreign investor and 
farmers who maintain control over their lands.  According 
to Murray Li (2011) compensations are far lower for the 
former than the latter. Her case study in Indonesia reveals 
that in Boul, the dividend being paid in 2009 to smallholders 
who had pooled their land was minimal: Rp350,000 per 
month, a tiny amount when compared to the Rp 4 – 5 million 
per month received by contract farmers in Morawali who 
maintained direct control of their plots but arranged for their 
farm output to be sold to the large farm nucleus set up by 
foreign investors in the area. 
• Lease or Purchase of Land
Table 1.7 of the World Bank report (2010) presents a list of 
“land expectation value for perennial crops”. One interesting 
point to highlight is that in Mozambique, the ¨expected¨ 
return to land per hectare per annum for the cultivation of 
sugarcane under irrigated (optimal) conditions is equal to 
$USD 9 750/ha. Investors however are currently charged 
only 60 cents (cited by Murray Li, 2011). Another related 
fact to stress is that a sugarcane producer in Zambia is said 
to make six times more money on one hectare smallholding 
than he or she could earn in wages working on the same 
crop in the context of a pooled investment project (Murray 
Li, 2011). In other words, there appears to be very different 
returns between capital and local inputs such as land and 
labour. 
Displacement or re-settlement as a result of a large-
scale farmland acquisition or leasing is one key matter for 
consideration. In February 2007 a senior representative 
of the Lao Government stated that “the issuing of land 
concessions and leases for tree plantations over large areas 
and for excessive periods has led to social and environmental 
problems and required both the resettlement of people and 
compulsory acquisition of the land which the people farm on. 
The people have lost their source of daily livelihood and lost 
their long term rights to use the land” (Kham Ouane boupha, 
Head of the national Land Management Authority, LAO PDR) 
(cited by LRAN, 2011)
Land is both an asset and a form of social security. An author 
of the IAASTD report (2009) noted: “a half-hectare plot in 
Thailand can grow 70 species of vegetables fruits and herbs, 
providing far better nutrition and feeding more people than 
a half-hectare plot of high yielding rice”. Land offers access 
to trees, water, grazing areas, etc.  Displacement or re-
settlement implies that rural dwellers have to spend more 
time to obtain water, firewood, and fruit or even to look after 
their home gardens.  The monetary value of their earnings 
will rarely match what they have lost in terms of time and 
resources and assets prior to losing their land (ActionAid, 
2012). 
Large-scale land acquisitions ignore the non-market unpaid 
work and the importance of social reproduction for economic 
growth (ActionAid, 2012). On the contrary, large-scale 
land acquisitions are often justified by pointing to the un-
viability of subsistence agriculture for significant national 
development. Just as the role of care or moral economy is 
excluded from orthodox or neoclassical views of development 
economics, so too is the value of most goods and services 
produced in agrarian systems, particularly with respect to 
food security (ActionAid, 2012, Saravia-Matus et al, 2012b). 
Murray Li (2011) discusses the predicament of people who 
are displaced from their “inefficient” farms. It is stated that 
opportunities to secure an alternative livelihood or a living 
wage are decisively scant.
A s s e s s m e n t  o f  L S L T ´ s  i n  t e r m s  o f  E f f i c i e n c y  / P r o d u c t i v i t y , 
T r a n s p a r e n c y  a n d  C o m p e n s a t i o n
Another form of compensation is said to be also found 
in terms of the benefits to local people in the form of 
infrastructure development. It is argued that only through 
farmland acquisition will certain public services reach these 
communities (water, electricity or roads).
But if displacement is associated to these improvements, the 
overall effect may not necessarily be positive. 
According to Wily, E.A. (2012) of the 70 conflicts raging 
across the world in 2008, 60 were in agrarian economies, 
where traditional land rights are not recognized, poverty 
persists and local institutions are weak. It is the case that 
when families who are forced to make a living by opening 
up new areas of forest and woodland for cultivation can 
lead to conflicts with previously settled communities over 
access to limited resources (LRAN 2011) leading to higher 
food insecurity, inequality and civil unrest. Moreover, if 
foreign investors target what to them appears to be empty 
land but is in fact a community’s ancestral burial ground, 
then passion and resentment will ensue (Kugelman and 
Leveinstein, 2009) 
The International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development organized by FAO in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2006 
reaffirmed the fundamental importance of wider secure and 
sustainable access to land, water and other natural resources 
and of agrarian reform for the eradication of hunger and 
poverty.  According to FAO director, Graziano Da Silva (FAO 
2012) the food security issue and sustainable development 
goes in hand with supporting smallholders’ access to 
food, income generation opportunities, strengthening of 
safety nets, cash for work, cash transfer that improve local 
production and consumption circuits. 
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C o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s
In this report we have addressed the main agents and 
drivers behind the recent wave of LSLT´s. The fact that there 
is a particular focus on flex-crops (those crops that may be 
used for food and biofuel production) indicates the nexus 
to food and energy security issues. From the investor side, 
key motives at government level were to secure food supply 
(availability & affordability) in the medium and long term 
for their growing populations, reduce import costs for food 
as well as dependence on international markets at times 
of price volatility. At private sector level, LSLT´s represent 
a lucrative investment alternative since shareholder value 
may be increased in a context of rising food prices (due to 
population growth and climate change), the emerging agro 
fuel markets and the general anticipation of growing land 
prices (GTZ, 2009). 
For Host countries one of the crucial challenges around 
LSLT´s relates to the difficulties associated to setting up 
land deals that are in line with food security and agricultural 
development principles, such as those reported by Hallam 
(2011): 
• Economic viability of local producers
• Food access and rural development
• Responsible agro-enterprise investment that promotes 
technological spill-overs, environmental sustainability & 
social welfare 
• Transparency and good governance
• Consultation and participation 
• Respect for land and resource rights
The review LSLT´s in Africa, the Black Sea region and Latin 
America also suggest that investors are not only foreign 
investors but that domestic or regional players have a 
relevant role. Similarly, LSLT´s in these regions differed in 
terms of business models, compensation schemes and 
labour regimes. Another key aspect to consider is that the 
return on investment for inputs used in LSLT´s are very 
different between capital and labour, with the latter being 
substantially higher in all surveyed regions.  
As stated, FAO estimates that additional investments of 
USD 83 billion annually are needed if developing country 
agriculture is to meet food needs in 2050 (FAO, 2010). But 
the review of issues of efficiency/productivity, transparency 
and adequate compensation in the context of LSLT´s (for 
all surveyed regions) reflects that it is necessary to further 
discuss what agricultural model is more suitable to feed the 
growing population in terms of environmental and social 
consequences that are particular to each context. In this 
sense, not only economic returns (based on short-term yields) 
have to be considered. It is also important to value non-
market goods and services emerging from (semi)subsistence 
farming systems before these are directly exchanged for farm 
wages or land rental payments. In the case labour-abundant 
countries, agricultural transformations will most likely have 
an effect in other sectors and geographical areas of the host 
countries (urban migration, increased unemployment, etc.). 
The debate around LSLT´s is thus really about the future 
shape of farming and the fate of rural populations (Scoones, 
2010a). It is also an issue of consumer sovereignty where 
global interests appear to be imposed on local food and 
energy sovereignty (McMichael 2010 as cited by Scoones 
2010b) (19) . 
It is also relevant to highlight that while there have been 
similar phenomena in the fishery and forestry sectors in the 
past, these have received far less attention than the current 
wave of LSLT´s. The latter is perhaps related to the great 
and direct social implications around LSLT´s. In this respect, 
a natural concern behind LSLT´s is that giving land away 
to large scale investors, having better access to capital to 
develop farm technology or access markets could guarantee 
increased production. The downside being that agricultural 
sectors will be transformed reducing their poverty-reducing 
impacts, not to mention any potential conflict surrounding 
land access. 
Binswanger and Deininger (1997) remind us that sustained 
growth of agricultural productivity will depend on the 
implementation of policies that induce research on new 
technologies as well as investment in human and physical 
capital. The latter has not reached smallholders and a large 
majority of low income countries tend to neglect primary 
education, under-invest in agricultural research and direct 
a disproportionate amount of the public resources to urban 
areas instead. This situation makes the policy discussion 
Concluding remarks
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around LSLT and other forms of investment in the agricultural 
sector of utmost relevance.
In this sense, it is essential to set up agricultural investment 
& LSLT specific frameworks which are beneficial to all 
involved stakeholders, especially rural small-holders. For 
this purpose, it is important to have reliable information, 
transparent negotiation processes, effective systems for 
integrating poor smallholders and equitable redistribution/
compensation schemes. In this respect, 2014 has been 
named by FAO as the year of “family farming”. This should 
be used as an opportunity to explore how the recent wave 
of LSLT´s can be directed to seeking an agricultural model 
which is socially inclusive and effective in feeding the planet 
in a sustainable manner, while also taking into consideration 
regional constraints and factors.
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N o t e s
(1) According to Deininger (2011) only 50% of announced 
deals signed in Africa have started initial investments or are 
already producing.
(2) In low income countries the question of food access 
is a key problem particularly in rural societies since the 
percentage of rural poor continues to be higher than the 
percentage of urban poor (Saturnino et al, 2012).  It is 
estimated that three-quarters of the world’s poor today live 
and work in the countryside (Saturnino et al, 2012).
(3) Following manufacturing in the 1980’s and information 
technology in the 1990’s. 
(4) The Economist: “Outsourcing’s third wave” May 21, 2009 
– The Guardian:  “How food and water are driving a 21st 
Century African land grab” 7 March 2012 – The Guardian: 
“Thousands ‘forcibly relocated’ in Ethiopia, says HRW report” 
17 January 2012 – BBC News:  “Land grab or development 
opportunity?” 22 February 2012, UNEP: “The rush for land 
and its potential environmental consequences” July 2011 
(5) Via Campesina: An international movement that ¨ defends 
small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way to promote 
social justice and dignity. It strongly opposes corporate driven 
agriculture and transnational companies that are destroying 
people and nature¨ www.viacampesina.org 
(6) The Land Matrix is an online public database that permits 
all users to contribute and improve data on land deals, and 
for this data to be visualized. The visualization offers both 
overviews of the data and complete access to the public 
database down to the level of an individual deal. The project 
is based on the partnership of various institutions: CIRAD, 
GIZ, ILC, Centre for Development Environment (CDE) and 
German Institute for Global Area Studies (GIGA).
(7) Each record in the database is assigned a reliability code. 
Information is sought for over 30 fields for each deal, but 
for legal reasons only 8 fields are published. Where possible, 
data is distributed to partners in host countries for cross-
checking. This may be achieved through personal interviews, 
direct personal knowledge of the transaction, or access to 
research that has not yet been published.
(8) Originally referred to servile dictatorships running 
countries whose economies were dominated by foreign-
owned fruit plantations (The Economist, May 24, 2012)
(9) The Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act of 2004 and the 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 have defined 
specialty crops as “fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried 
fruits, horticulture, and nursery crops (including floriculture).” 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/scbgpdefinitions
(10) Refer to FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests & World 
Bank 2010 report on ¨Rising Interest in Farmland¨ 
(11) Amoroso and Gomez y Paloma (2007) provide a 
synthesis of Sweezy´s  interpretation of the economic cycle.
(12) Defined as state-owned investment funds composed 
of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, property, precious 
metals, or other financial instruments (UNCTAD, 2009)
(13) The empirical findings suggest that an increase in oil 
price by 1$/barrel increases the agricultural commodity 
prices between 0.10$/tonne and 1.80$/tonne (Ciaian and 
Kancs, 2011).
(14) Although according to Land Matrix data, the majority of 
the Chinese land deals are registered in the region of South 
East Asia
(15) The authors have calculated that average annual 
income per household is 76.98 GB pounds for rice and 88.25 
GB pounds for vegetable.
(16) According to the Land Matrix about 325 000 hectares 
have been acquired by Black Earth in the Russian Federation
(17) “86% of staples in poor areas come from local sources, 
so country-level efforts to support smallholder agriculture 
are critical”. 
(18) Semi-mechanized sorghum and sesame production 
in Sudan illustrates the risks of large-scale farming and 
holds lessons for current investors. In an agro-ecological 
environment comparable to Australia, where yields are 4 t/
ha, sorghum yields are only 0.5 t/ha and have been stagnant 
or declining (World Bank, 2010).
Notes
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(19) Simultaneously, the consumption patterns should also 
be aligned to a sustainable food, feed and fuel production 
system. Diets can be shifted towards smaller environmental 
footprint and a reduction of food losses. FAO estimates that 
global food losses and waste amount to 1.3 billion tonnes 
per year – roughly one-third of the world food production 
for human consumption – and correspond to more than 10 
percent of the world’s total caloric energy consumption (FAO, 
2012). A reduction of waste could thus serve to reduce the 
current pressure on key resources such as land and water.
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